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The breakup of the Soviet Union and the head long rush of its fonner East European
satellites to rejoin the West have placed Russia in a difficult position. Faced with
seemingly insurmountable political and economic difficulties as it makes its transition
from communism and a centrally planned economy to its own fonn of democracy and a
market economy, Russia realizes that it needs Western aid and technology. On the other
hand, similar attempts by its fonner East European satellites threaten to isolate Russia
from the rest of Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War era, it is the task of Russian
foreign policy to prevent Russia's isolation from Europe. A Russia denied the benefits
of European trade and political and economic assistance can only sink into domestic
chaos. This thesis examines Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War era
in relation to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the three East European nations
which promise to hold the keys to Russian participation in or isolation from the European
system. The thesis examines the Russian national interest in the region, as well as the
evolving security and economic relationship between Russia and East Central Europe.
The thesis concludes that the task of Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold
War era is to develop better economic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland.
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On Christmas Eve 1991, the red, white, and blue tricolor of the Russian Republic
replaced the red sickle and hammer of the Soviet Union atop the Kremlin in Moscow
where it had flown for over fifty years. The changing of the Kremlin flag symbolized not
only the end of the Soviet Union, but also the culmination of dramatic changes throughout
Eastern Europe that began in November 1989, as one by one the <;ommunist governments
in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states were overthrown.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the head long rush of its fonner East European
satellites to rejoin the West have placed Russia in a difficult position. Faced with
seemingly insurmountable political and economic difficulties as it makes its transition
from communism and a centrally planned economy to its own fonn of democracy and a
market economy, Russia realizes that it needs Western aid and technology. On the other
hand, similar attempts by its fonner East European satellites threaten to isolate Russia
from the rest of Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War era, it is the task of Russian
foreign policy to prevent Russia's isolation from Europe. A Russia denied the benefits
of European trade and political and economic assistance can only sink into domestiL:
chaos. It is the purpose of this study to examine Russian foreign policy in relation to
I
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the three East European nations which promise to
hold the keys to Russian participation in or isolation from the European system.
Not only does the breakup of the Soviet Union pose external political problems for
.Russia, but as the empire dissolves into fifteen individual republics, the West is faced
with the difficulty of having to detennine how to deal with the fifteen new entities.
Western policy toward the republics of the former Soviet Union is complicated by the fact
that since 1917 many in the West have used the terms "Russia" and "Soviet Union" as
if they were interchangeable. A brief glance at a map of the old Soviet Union shows that
Russia (or the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, now simply Russia) was only
one of fifteen union republics. While there was little doubt that Russia was first among
equals, it is incorrect nonetheless to equate Russia with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
that equation has colored our thinking for not only the past seventy years, but certainly
the past 300 years. However, the new realities of the independence of Ukraine, Belarus'
and the Baltic States have resulted in "Russia's" historic European borders being shifted
between 300 and 800 miles to the east. In fact, Russia's present European border is
roughly that of its predecessor, Muscovy, in 1648. In addition, with the loss of the Baltic
states, Russia has lost unlimited physical access to Baltic ports. Although it still controls
Kaliningrad and has access to the Baltic Sea through St Petersburg, the loss of the Baltic
States and the reduction of Russia's borders have effectively separated Russia from a
Europe to which it so desperately wishes to remain a part.
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The fact remains, however, that of the successor states to the Soviet Union, only
Russia has the potential to remain a dominant force in the region. Of the successor states
to the Soviet Union, Russia retains nearly 51 percent of the population and 76 percent of
the area of the fonner Soviet Union! In tenns of industrial output, in 19S9 Russia was
responsible for nearly 91 percent of the petroleum and 77 percent of natural gas
production in the Soviet Union, as well as 55.4 percent of the steel production of the old
Union? In addition, according to the Russian Board of Statistics, in 1991, Russia
accounted for 80 percent of Soviet exports and 59.3 percent of Soviet imports.' In the
political realm, Russia has agreed to assume 57.8 percent of the former Soviet Union's
R1.050 trillion foreign debt,4 and still retains the bulk of the conventional and nuclear
military capability of the ancien regime.s By comparison, in 1989, Ukraine produced
IPopulation based on the 1989 census. See Raymond E. Zicke1, ed. Soviet Union: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991),804.
2Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 (Moscow: 1990), 33K
3"Extemal Trade Drops 38 Percent in 1991" (text), Moscow Interfax in English. 11.)35 GMT. 7 February
1992. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS) Daily Report. Central Eurasia
(FBIS-SOV-92-027, 10 February 1992): 19.
4By comparison Ukraine has agreed to take on 17.8 percent (Ri76 billion) of the fonner Soviet debt.
while Belarus' will assume 3.8 percent (R37.7 billion). igor Pogosov. "Distribution of Former Soviet Debt
Discussed" (text), Moscow [zvestia in Russian, 24 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Repon.
Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-018, 28 January 1992): 17.
SIn terms of conventional military forces, 71 of 130 ground divisions (54.6 pen;enl). IAOO of 2.160
interceptor aircraft (64.8 percent), and 980 of 3.060 tactical aircraft (32.0 percent) of thc formcr Soviet
Army remain on Russian soil. In addition, Moscow chums another 16 divisions in Mongolia and Eastern
Europe. In contrast, only 20 divisions, 230 interceptors. and 620 tactical aircraft are on Ukrainian soil. See
Alexander Tsygankov, "Lopatin: Three Reform Alternatives" (text). Moscow Moscow News in English. 52
(1991). Joint Publications Research Service (hereinafter cited as JPRS) Repon Soviet Union. Milit,uy
Affairs (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992): 76.
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only 9 percent of the Soviet Union's oil and 3.9 percent of its natural gas. Ukraine was
also responsible for 34.2 percent of steel production.6 These facts indicate that Russia,
despite challenges from Ukraine, has the potential to be the greatest of the successors to
the old Soviet Union.
However, Russia's potential political and economic power in the post-Soviet era
does not necessarily mean it will be able to impose its will upon Ukraine and Belarus'.
Certainly there are many Russian nationalists, notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who still
regard Ukraine and Belarus' as inseparable from Russia, an attitude which, just as
certainly, has not been lost on either the Ukrainians or the Belarus'. 7 Nevertheless, at
least Ukraine has the capability to resist Russian attempts to influence Ukraine's position
in post-Cold War Europe. Despite Ukraine's insistence that it desires to become a
nuclear-free state, as long as Russia retains nuclear weapons and continues to harbor
sentiments of the union of Russia and Ukraine, and the implied Russian domination that
goes along with it, Ukraine will probably keep the nuclear weapons on its soil. Ukraine's
ability to use those weapons or to effectively defend its territory is a subject open to
debate beyond the scope of this study, but the fact remains that, at least for the near term,
6Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989, 338.
7Solzhenitsyn, of course. is not the only Russian nationalist who desires maintcnanl:c of thc historil:
European borders. In a 29 January 1992, Pravda article, Russian Vice Prcsident Aleksandr Rutskoi
denounced the Yeltsin government as a "wrecking team" and called for the reslOrationof Russia's "historil:al
borders" and a review of its present borders. In a 13 February 1992. interview with Ne:avisitlUlWl (/a:eta,
Rutskoi said he would fight for "reestablishment of a single democratic state unitcd on thc territory of the
greater Eurasian territory." See Alexander Rahr, "Rutskoi Resumes Altal:k," Radio Free Europc/Radio
Liberty (hereafter cited as RFEtRL) Daily Report, 30 January 1992. Also Alexander Rahr. "Rutskoi Favours
Great Russian State," RFE(RL Daily Report, 14 February 1992.
4
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an independent Ukraine hampers Russian attempts to influence international affairs In
Europe..
Indeed, the increased distance between Russia and the rest of Europe caused by
Belarus' and Ukrainian independence forces Russia into a minor state of isolation. At the
very least, Russia's new borders complicate its relationship with the rest of Europe,
particularly if one considers that historically Russia's ability to influence European affairs
has depended largely on the amount of control it has been able to exert over Eastern
Europe. For example, Russia's self-proclaimed role as the "gendarme of Europe" between
1815 and 1854 was determined by its ability to threaten Europe through its alliance with
Austria and Prussia and by stationing Russian troops in Poland. By the same token, the
Soviet Union was able to influence European affairs throughout the post-World War II
era by the fact that it militarily occupied Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Of
course, one cannot overlook the impact the large Soviet nuclear arsenal had upon
European politics, but the point here is that, in a sense, Russia's security historically has
focused on a certain amount of control over portions of Eastern Europe.
Indeed, it has been the nations of East Central Europe (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland)8 which have been the historic keys to Russian security and will continue to
8Not only does the breakup of the Soviet Union dictate a rethinking of rclatiolls with its fonlH.:r
republics, but the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe necessitates a redefinition of gcographil:
references throughout the region. In the Cold War era Eastern Europe referred to the European portion of
the Soviet Union as well as the satellite states of the Soviet Union. i.e .. Bulgaria. Czedloslovakia. East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania -- the Non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pal:l. BeClllse of their
communist governments, Albania and Yugoslavia were also included in the hroad definitioll of Eastern
Europe. However, grouping all these states together as "Eastern Europe" ignores l:ultural and historil:al
differences which set their peoples apart. In the New European Order. Eastern Europe lIlore ;Iptly refers
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figure in Russian relations with Europe. Of course, the obvious lJ.uestion IS how
important will East Central Europe be in Russian-European relations if Belarus' and
Ukraine separate the two regions? Indeed, the independence of Belarus' and Ukraine will
complicate Russia's European relations; however, if Russia does have desires to
reincorporate Belarus' and Ukraine into some new political entity, it is l:ertainly in its
strategic interest to develop close relations with the countries to the west of Belarus' and
Ukraine -- Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Thus, Russia would be able to isolate
Ukraine and Belarus' forcing a new political relationship between Russia and its former
dominions.
Even if Russia has no imperial designs on Belarus' and Ukraine, East Central
Europe will still remain an important region in Russian foreign affairs for economic and
geostrategic reasons. Indeed, in a 6 March 1992 article in Nezavisimava Gazeta, Sergey
Rogov, Deputy Director of the United States and Canada Institllte, stated, "Although
Russia is now separated from [this regionl ... by a belt of former Soviet republics,
to the Eastern Slavic nations of Belarus', Russia. and Ukraine. Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania.
geographically located on the Baltic Sea. are, of course. the Baltic States. But morc importanlly. thc Bailie
States are grouped together because of a common Germanic cthnic and culluml herilagc. Whilc the
southern communist states of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania. the fragments of old Yugoslavia (Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and the new. smaller Yugoslavia). and the newly independcllt f0I111Cr Sovict
republic of Moldova represent varied cultuml and historic past,>. the political chaos and slow pacc of Ihe
growth of democracy are endemic 10 the Balkan region to which they bclong. As lor CI.echos!ovakia.
Hungary, and Poland, while they are ethnically Slavic (in the casc of Czcchoslovakia and Poland). Ihey arc
cultumlly Western. Geographically these three nations form a hridge betwccn Eastcrn Europe am! Cenlral
Europe, hence the reference East Central.Europe.
6
geopolitically and economically we cannot withdraw from [this I part of the world. "I)
Economically East Central Europe still represents a sizeable market for Russian products,
especially natural resources. While East Central Europe can get better and cheaper
consumer goods from the West, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland receive nearly all
of their oil and natural gas from Russia. In addition, although trade between East Central
Europe and Russia may be more vital to the Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles than
to the Russians, the economic conditions in which Russia finds itself suggest it cannot
afford to disregard any potential market for any product.
In addition, from a geopolitical standpoint, East Central Europe has historically
represented the frontier separating Western Europe and the historic Russian state, either
the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. In a sense, the countries of East Central Europe
have formed a highway for both Western political and social culture as well as invading
Western armies. By the same token, East Central Europe has served as a garrison
location for Russian troops that have threatened Western Europe.
There is also another consideration which may complicate Russian relations with
the nations of East Central Europe: the memory of forty odd years of Soviet domination
is not likely to disappear quickly. Indeed, the environmental damage caused by industry
heavily dependent on cheap Soviet energy and resources will remain a constant reminder
of Soviet imperial occupation for some time. Industrial damage to the environment is
9Sergey Rogov, "Security Issues Facing Russia Discussed" (text). Moscow Ne:avisiflUlva (ja:ew in
Russian, 6 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-lJ2-045. 6 March
1992): 18.
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compounded by damage caused by Red Army troops in exercises and maneuvers
throughout these nations. Perhaps most important is the memory of the thousands who
died at the hands of Soviet troops and Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish anny and
internal security forces throughout the post-war era in demonstrations and revolts against
an alien form of government. Yet, despite the damage and suffering caused by the years
of Soviet occupation, the nations of East Central Europe realize that a major power lies
to their east which they must consider for security and economic reasons. 10
In examining Russian relations with East Central Europe, this study will begin with
an examination of the Russian national interest in the region. Any study of the
relationships between nations must begin with an understanding of the motive forces
behind any given action a state might take. Chapter III examines the new security
relations between the regions, while Chapter IV addresses the changing economic
relationship between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland and Russia. The study
concludes by presenting policy options Russia might take in its relationship with East
Central Europe and implications for the United States.
The world is rapidly changing as new political relationships are forged and old
partnerships die. Yet what has gone before, the past actions of states in their dealings
with the world, cannot be easily forgotten. The task for Russia is to overcome its
lOIn this regard, Polish Foreign Minister Knysztof Skubiszewski stated in a March llJlJ2. inlerview.
"An extremely significant element of Poland's foreign policy is its relations wilh lhe East. and mosl
importantly with Russia." Vladas Burbulis. "Polish Minister Skubiszewski on Foreign Tics" (lexl). Moscow
TASS in English. 1957 GMT. 17 March 1992. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SUV-lJ2-11:'i3.
18 March 1992): 20.
8
perception as an imperial power and make an honest effort to rejoin the family of nations.
The key to Russian success, both in internal reform and greater European relations, lies
through East Central Europe. Russia's foreign policy failure in this area can only result
in the failure of its internal reforms and the onset of political and social chaos.
9
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II
RETHINKING THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST
IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped
in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key
is Russian national interest. -- Winston Churchill
A. WHAT IS THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST?
In order to understand how Russia, or any nation for that matter, will behave in a
given situation one must understand the motivations behind a given act. What are those
motivations and how does a nation determine the relative importance of a given goal or
act? While the answer is simple, defining it is quite difficult Generally, actions taken
by a nation in its relationships with other nations are motivated by the national interest.
A simple defmition of the term would be the "ends" of foreign policy,11 but such a
definition could justify nearly any action a state might take. Examples of national interest
in this context might be German occupation of the Sudetenland in 193X or Soviet
occupation of the Baltic States, portions of Poland, and Bessarabia in 1939 and 1940.
National interest, however, must encompass much more and must involve an internal
political debate within a given country. In addition, national interest re4uires that a
particular policy or policies be shown to be of service to the society's values. 12 This
"Roy E. Jones, Analysing Foreign Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 11.J70). 20.
'2Ibid.,21-22.
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suggests that a nation's national interest evolves as the nation's history and culture evolve
and, indeed, the idea of the national interest has evolved as man's political history
evolved.
In fact, what we would call the national interest today is a product of the nation-state
system born out of the French Revolution. Prior to 1789, state actions were governed by
differing sets of priorities and goals. During the Middle Ages, state actions were
governed by dynastic interest or the desire of each monarch to expand his domain. 13
However, dynastic interest was only effective as a guiding philosophy as long as a given
prince controlled a small area and could surround himself with only a few advisors. As
a merchant class began to rise, the prince could no longer afford to ignore their desires. 14
Indeed, as more and more groups within the prince's domain began to attach their
interests to those of the monarch, dynastic interest became replaced by the "reason of
state" (or raison d'etat, ragioni di stato, staatsriison).15 Raison d'etat could best be
described as "maintaining in power the practicing government, whether republican or
royal, crushing dangerous opposition at home, extending dominion and intluence abroad,
and enriching the ruling class of the state."16 However, Raison d' etat tended to ignore
the increasing importance of the economic relationship between states in the sense that
13Fred A. Sonderman, "The Concept of the Nalional Inleresl." Orbis 21 (Spring IlJ77): 122.




nations could benefit from mutual free trade. At the time, nations favored mercantilist
trade which advocated protection of the domestic economy through government
intervention. As nations began to realize that national economies were effected by foreign
economies, and as the influence of popular control and the nation-state system itself began
to grow, raison d'etat became more closely associated with "public interest" which
eventually evolved into the "national interest. ,,17
Nevertheless, while national interest is a product of the development of the nation-state
system, the concept still encompasses all the qualities of the previous systems.l~ Indeed,
as Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane stated, the national interest of a nation could
be broken into three "irreducible" interests:
1) physical survival of the people, though not necessarily of the state's territory
2) liberty or the ability of the inhabitants to freely function under a set of
rights defined by law and under a government of their choosing
3) economic subsistence or maximizing the economic welfare of the state")
In these three interests one can see how national interest derived from the prevlOus
systems.
However, even this definition does not encompass all the elements of the concept of
national interest While the development of national interest from dynastic interest and
raison d'etat illustrates the influence of political institutions, even these institutions do




not consume the entire essence of a nation-state, nor all the elements implied by the term
national interest. In each of these terms, one-half of the concept is the term nation. The
state may be defined as a "geographically bounded entity governed by a central authority
that has the ability to make laws, rules, and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules,
and decisions within its boundaries. ,,20 Therefore, state consists of the political
institu~ons governing a particular geographic entity. Nation, on the other hand,
encompasses the cultural institutions that bind the people of a given geographic entity.
Strictly speaking, a nation is a grouping of people who consider themselves as being
linked to one another in some manner. This could be culturally, ethnically, or
linguistically.21 Understanding the concept of nation is essential to an understanding of
national interest in that the national interest is determined within the political and cultural
context in which the foreign policy is formulated.22 In addition, it is important to realize
that as the culture, history, and traditions of a nation-state evolve, so does its national
interest Or perhaps more likely, national interest remains constant, but the way it is
verbalized, or expressed, changes with time. In addition, the national interest remains the
20Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan. ll)l) I). 26.
21Ibid.,27.
22Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5111 cd. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),9.
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same, despite domestic political change?3 Even a revolutionary statel:unnot forget the
traditions of its nation.
An understanding of the evolution of national interest as a framework for foreign
policy and how national interest is fonnulated within the political and cultural context of
the particular nation-state, fonns the foundation for establishing a definition of the
concept. Hans J. Morgenthau defined national interest as the absolute minimum that
diplomacy must defend at all costs.24 As such, the foreign poFcies of nations must
"necessarily refer to their survival as minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what
they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against
encroachments by other nations. ,,25 Therefore, national interest is "that which a state and
its people feel to be pennanently essential to continued national existence and
development. ,,26
Russia is no different from any other nation in that its national interest is deteonined
through an internal political debate and is couched in teons of Russian history and
culture. However, while the Russian national interest in a given region may seem
obvious to a Russian, it may not be so clear to others. Because the Russian national
23Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Principles of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press.
1956), 35-36.
24Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 540-541.
25Hans J: Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of thc US." Thc Amcrican
Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 972.
2~erche, 34.
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interest in a given region, in this case East Central Europe, is int1uenced by Russia culture
and history, any understanding of that interest must be based on an appreciation of the
Russian place in Europe. This is particularly important given the final demise of the
Russian Empire and the fact that Russia's European borders have returned to where they
were roughly at the time of Peter the Great. Indeed, for much of the last 300 years the
lands to the west of Russia have fonned the frontier separating Muscovy from Europe.
For example, Ukraine's importance in the history of Russian relations with Europe is
signified by the meaning of its name: borderland. The loss of Belarus' and Ukraine have
no doubt been a tremendous shock to Russian nationalists,27 not only be<.:ause of the
separation of the three Eastern Slavic peoples, but also because of the loss of an historic
buffer between Russia and Europe.
Nor is this feeling restricted to only the Union Republics. In the period fOllowing the
revolutions in Eastern Europe, there were those in the Soviet Union seeking to detennine
"who lost Eastern Europe." Many laid the blame at the feet of General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze for not taking a more hard-line approach towards the revolutions of 1989.
The argument stemmed not so much from the fact that the Soviet Union "owned" Eastern
Europe, but from the belief that the Soviet Union's national se<.:urity could not be
27The depth of the feeling among Russians at the loss of Belarus' and Ukraine was <kscribed by
Eduard Volodin, secretary of the Scholarly Council of Problems of Russian Culturc and (hc USSR Acadcmy
of Sciences, when he said that it would be a "national tragedy" if the Ukr...ine and Bydol1lssia left the
Soviet Union. See John B. Dunlop, "Ethnic Russian on Possible Breakup of the USSR." Report on the
USSR, 2 March 1991, 16.
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guaranteed without its East European buffer.28 Even two years later, when it was
beginning to be accepted that the USSR had neither the military nor economic means to
occupy Eastern Europe, some in the Soviet Union still viewed Eastern Europe as lying
within the Soviet sphere of influence. In this regard a paper prepared by the International
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated:
Over the past two years... this [European] region has been unjustifiably thrust into the
background in the system of our international priorities... [The] active penetration by
the West [has led to a] loss of Soviet interests.29
The Soviet position on Eastern Europe as a buffer introduces an impol1ant factor in
Russian history; geography. Indeed, geography was the decisive feature of Russian
history. The terrain of the western steppes and central European plain left Russia with
no natural frontier and, in fact, these features facilitated both foreign invasion and Russian
expansion.30 One must remember that the plains of Poland served as a highway for
invasion by the Teutonic Knights and Poles during the Middle Ages, Napoleon in 1812,
and the Germans in 1914 and 1941. Indeed, it could be said that while Russia had no
frontier, for centuries it was, in fact, the European frontier; fighting the Mongol hordes
28Suzanne Crow, '''Who Lost Eastern Europe?''' Report on the USSR, 12 April IYY I. I.
29"New East European Strategy From Moscow" (text), Frankfurt-am-Main Franktilrter Allgemeine in
German, 7 June 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-YI-121. 24 June
1991): 23.
30Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, Robert Conquest ed.. (New York: Mal:Graw Hill. IY74). 10.
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that swept westward from China and then submitting to Mongol domination to save the
rest of Europe from a similar fate. 31
At the same time it was this Mongol domination which gave Russia its unique cultural
heritage. Situated between Europe and Asia it exhibits characteristics of both continents,
yet it defies definition as either European or Asian. In fact, the inhabitants of each
continent see Russia as belonging to the other: Europeans see it as politically Asian, while
Asiatics see it as culturally European.32 Indeed, the astute nineteenth century observer
of Russian political and social culture, the Marquis de Custine, wrote that "[Russia
represents] a terrible combination of Europe's intelligence and science with Asiatic
genius."33 In 1836, Peter Chaadayev, nineteenth century author who could be classified
among those Russian intellectuals called "Westernizers," wrote, "We are neither of the
West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either."34 During the same
period, the great Russian writer Alexander Pushkin described Russia as never having
"anything in common with the rest of Europe...its history requires ideas and formulas that
31Ibid.• 10.
32Robert G. Wesson. The Russian Dilemma (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univl:rsity Prl:ss. 1l)74). 3l) .
.
33Astolphe Louis Leonard. Marquis de Custine. Journey for Our Time, quoted in Robert Hingley. The
Russian Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1977), 143.
34Hingley, 143.
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are different from the ideas and fonnulas deduced... from the history of the Christian
West. ,,35
Throughout the course of Russian history, the idea that Russia must remain aloof from
the rest of Europe has waxed and waned. At times Russia has seemed to have been
willing, almost begging for Western ideas and technology. However, this sentiment has
only lasted for brief periods in which only enough Western influence was allowed to
penetrate the frontier to make limited, pre-determined reforms, but not enough so as to
radically alter (or undermine) the existing order. Once the desired change has been
achieved, or if Western influence begins to upset the course of events, contact is broken
off. As Peter the Great, the first great Westernizer said, "We need Europe for a few
decades, and then we must turn our back on it."36 In this sense, Russia has seen the
maintenance of its frontiers as a means of controlling the influx of foreign intluence.
Indeed, this belief in closely guarding Russia's borders can be found as early as the
seventeenth century when Jurij Krizanic wrote:
Next to autocracy itself the most valuable of our traditions is the dosing of frontiers,
i.e. the prohibition to foreigners of facile access to our country, and the prohibitions
to our people of wandering outside the borders of the realm without important
reason...The heart and soul of this kingdom is the closing of frontiers... J?
35Ibid.• 143. In a similar vein Diderot is said to have commented to Catherinc thc Great. "When an
idea is transplanted from Europe to Russia. it altogether changes its complexion." Sec Wesson. 1)0.
36Hingley. 144.
37Szamuely,62. Krifanic was. incidentally. a Croat not a Russian. Nevertheless. he is a significant
figure in Russian political thought for he was the first to expound the ideas of pan-Slavislll.
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Throughout Russian history one sees the development of a state which could best be
described as a European state and Oriental empire. A state which does not fit
conveniently into our orderly division of the world into occident and orient, but displays
the characteristics of both. A state which believes it must isolate itself from Europe or
at least control outside access. Therefore it is within this context that Russian national
interest has developed. Through this national interest one can see the reasoning for
Russian expansion in Europe. Indeed, historically Russia has conquered and subduecl only
contiguous territories. At the same time, Russia has been reluctant to surrender this
territory once finnly occupied. It has surrendered some noncontiguous holdings, such as
Alaska, but to yield any of its border territories has historically been regarded as a
national tragedy.38
Russia's national interest finds its roots in a desire to maintain its cultural, political,
and social development, but how has this interest been expressed? While maintaining the
security of the Russian frontier from both intellectual and military invasion has figured
prominently in its history, this has not necessarily been the only expression of Russian
national interest. Indeed, thirty years ago the historian Cyril Black wrote that four major
themes in foreign policy have been prevalent throughout tsarist and Soviet history. Those
themes are: the desire for stable frontiers; an assurance of favorable conditions for
economic growth; the unification of territories considered to be Russian by vittue of
38Wesson, 10-11.
19
dynastic, religious, or national claims; and participation in alliance systems and
international institutions.39
Obviously, the implicit argument here is that Russian foreign policy has essentially
remained the same in character under both the tsars and commissars. Indeed, the only
difference between the two has been the ideological bend each government gave to its
foreign policy. For imperial Russia, foreign policy was colored by a desire to preserve,
or even advance, the autocratic form of government, while at brief intervals inserting
some pan-Slavism.40 On the other hand, Soviet foreign policy was developed in terms
of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Despite these differing ideologies, the basic philosophy of
Russian and Soviet foreign policy did not change. Given that culture, history, and
tradition influence the national interest and, therefore, foreign policy, can parallels be
drawn from the past and applied to the present? Yes they can, although it must be
realized that historical situations never parallel the present exactly. Nevertheless, past
actions by Russia, whether imperial or Soviet, can demonstrate what is important to
Russia with regard to the present.
39Cyril E. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical
Perspective, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962).6.
4°It should be noted that pan-Slavism enjoyed a greater following among the itlielligelllsia than it ever
had among government officials. However. it did color Russian foreign policy toward Austria-Hung:u'Y in
the Balkans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An excellent example or pan-Slavism
gone awry is the change in Russian foreign policy orientation from Germany to Franl:e in the period IX75-
1890. George F. Kennan's book The Decline of Bismarck's Europe:m Order: Franw-Russian Relations.
1875-1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979) offers an insight into the impal:t pan-Slavislll and
members of the intelligentsia had on Russian foreign policy during the period.
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B. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
UNDER THE TSARS AND COMMISSARS
In examining the Russian national interest in East Central Europe three important
points must be understood. First. it must be recognized that while Black's four themes
are characteristic of Russian foreign policy in general, they do not necessarily apply
uniformly to all regions. For example. while imperial Russian expansion toward the
Dardanelles may be explained in terms of economic development, the same case could
not be made for imperial control of large portions of Poland. By the same token. Soviet
control of East European economies between 1949 and 1989 was more likely an
additional means of dominating the region rather than a means of improving the Soviet
economy.41 At the same time, Russia cannot be said to have any dynastic claims on
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, although Russian occupation of most of Poland between
1795 and 1918 might give them some cause. in Russia's view. to claim pans of that
country. It is also important to realize Black's themes are not separate. distinct entities,
but may overlap. For example. the desire for a stable frontier may lead to the creation
of an alliance system to insure the security of the border. Similarly, Russia's desire to
either neutralize or occupy Poland proceeds from the belief that P.oland is key to Russia's
security.
41However, in the immediate post-war period, the Soviets stripped East CClllral Europc o!" industrial
machinery and sent it to the Soviet Union. Therefore, initially. Soviet economic policy in East Ccnu'al
Europe was geared to benefit the Soviet Union. Yet. over the course of forty ycars Sovict cconomic policy
in the region was designed to ensure domination of Czechoslovakia. Hungary. and Poland.
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Secondly, it must be realized that for the bulk of the period 1800-1991, the states of
modern East Central Europe were divided among the major East European imperial
powers and did not take on their current shape until after World War II. Poland had been
carved up between Austria, Prussia, and Russia during the partitions of 1772, 1793, and
1795. It did not become independent until 1918 and after World War II its pre-war
borders were moved several hundred miles to the west. Czechoslovakia was part of the
Austrian Empire and after the Ausgleich in 1867, two of its current three republics,
Bohemia and Moravia, were ruled by Austria, while Slovakia was under Hungarian rule.
Hungary, of course, was a major partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Both
Czechoslovakia and Hungary became independent in 1918 as well, and like Poland, their
borders were redrawn to their current positions following World War II. The point to
remember, then is that for much of the tsarist era, Russian interests in East Central
Europe were in terms of its direct relationship with Austria-Hungary and Prussia (later
unified Germany). After World War I, Soviet Russia was forced to deal directly with the
independent governments of the new states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary. and Poland, even
though its relationship to those nations was still governed by its relationship with the
major Western powers. After World War II, the satellite status of Eastern Europe left the
foreign policies of those states essentially at the mercy of Soviet interests.
Perhaps the most important factor in determining foreign policy issues during the
tsarist and Soviet periods was the extent to which ideology int1uenced the actions of the
imperial and communist governments. However, this is not to suggest that ideology has
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always held an important position in Russian foreign policy. Prior to 1789, the fact that
the powers of Europe practiced essentially the same fonn of government, monarchy
(whether absolutist or "enlightened"), made the issue of ideology unnecessary. However,
as the revolutionary fervor of the French Revolution spread throughout Europe during the
first half of the nineteenth century, Russia increasingly came to see the republican ideals
of the French Revolution as a threat to its very existence. Between 1815 and 1854,
Russia's main policy objective in Europe was to crush revolution, wherever it may occur,
and prevent revolution from infecting the Russian people. After the Crimean War,
ideology was still an important factor in tsarist foreign policy, although without the
reactionary anti-revolutionary tilt of the earlier period.
The issue of ideology blurs the transition in Russian history from the dynastic interest
to the national interest. Indeed, if national interest differs from dynastic interest in that
national interest must take into consideration many competing interest groups and
political, social, and economic interests, then one might argue that Russia has never been
governed by a national interest, but only by a dynastic interest or, more appropriately,
raisond'etat. For much of the tsarist era this was true, but following the Crimean War,
especially after 1875, Russian foreign policy became increasingly intluenced by forces
outside the tsar's government,42 In addition, while the Russian Empire and the Soviet
42Kennan's Decline of Bismarck's European Order describes how the foreign policies of Tsars
Alexander II and Alexander III toward Germany became intluenced by ultranationalists outside the
government. In addition, imperial economic policy in Russian Poland was intluenced by Russian
industrialists. See below page 27.
23
Union were multinational states, the foreign policies of their respective governments were,
to a certain extent, influenced by Russian nationalism. While the Soviet government
attempted to replace nationalism with international worker solidarity based on Marx's
belief that the struggle of the international proletariate against international capitalism
would transcend nationalistic sentiment, Soviet nationality policy within the Union can
only be described as promoting Russian nationalism and culture above all others.43 At
the same time, Soviet foreign policy in Europe, while certainly influenced by Marxism-
Leninism, was geared toward the preservation of uniquely Russian institutions. Therefore,
while preservation of the Russian form of government was a significant factor in imperial
and Soviet foreign policy, it was not the only consideration.
Given the importance of ideology in the foreign policy of the tsars, one could say that
the national interest of the Russian Empire in East Central Europe was to protect the
autocratic government by preventing the rise and spread of competing political ideologies
regardless of the cost. as well as protecting the unique Russian culture from excessive
Western influence. In addition. if the autocratic form of government could be spread to
adjacent states, so much the better. Therefore, based on Black's four themes tsarist
Russia operationalized its national interest in East Central Europe by arranging the themes
in the following order: stable frontiers; alliance systems; dynastic lands; economic gain.
43The primacy of the Russian nation above all others in the Soviet Union is best illustrated by Stalin's
toast to the greatness of the Russian people above all and their importance in defeating Nazi-Germany.
Much has been written regarding the relationship of the Soviet government to the many nat ionalities under
its rule. A primer and general history of Soviet nationality policy is Bohdan Nahaylo and Vil:\or Swaboda.
Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press. It.lt.IO).
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The issue of a stable frontier was decided at the Congress of Vienna in IXIS. During
the course of the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon had.created an "independent" Grand Duchy
of Warsaw out of Polish lands held by Austria and Prussia. The Duchy had been the
jump-off point for the French invasion of Russia in 1812 and Tsar Alexander 1 believed
that a Russian controlled Poland would secure Russia's border. Therefore, the tsar
insisted upon and received the creation of a Kingdom of Poland with the Russian tsar as
king. The "Congress Kingdom," as new Poland became known, provided a buffer
between Austria and Prussia and Russia.
The centerpiece of Russian foreign policy between 1815 and 1854, however, was the
creation of the so-called Holy Alliance between Russia and Austria and Prussia.
Originally entered into in 1814 to prevent war between the three great East European
powers, it lapsed in 1827. By 1830, it appeared the alliance would be necessary to
prevent the spread of revolutionary ideals throughout Eastern Europe. It was through its
association with the Holy Alliance that Russia became the self-styled "gl'lIClurml' of
Europe." By 1830, the anti-monarchy movement spreading through Eastern Europe
threatened the existence of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Empires. By the terms
of the Holy Alliance, the parties agreed to aid any party threatened by revolt and to come
to each others' aid if threatened by an outside power while engaged in suppressing a
revolt.44 Twice in 1830, Russia was prepared to intervene militarily in West European
44 .Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Forci!!1\ Policv. IX14-1lJ74
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 100-10 I.
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revolution, in France and in Belgium, and might well have had it not been for the Polish
Revolution of 1830. Russian troops were required to put down that revolt, which ended
in 1831, and the tsar's army was instrumental in squashing the Hungarian Revolution in
1848 and returning stability to the Austrian Empire. At the same time, Russia's
willingness to use troops in Hungary and Poland demonstrated the tsar's fear that
revolutionary ideals might spread into Russia proper.
While Russia may have seen the need to use force to put down East European
rebellion in the 1830s and 1840s as necessary to preserve its political and social
institutions, neither France nor Great Britain saw Russian actions as defensive in nature.
To the two great West European powers, Russia's reactionary policies only served to
vividly illustrate what Custine had written in 1839:
[Russia wishes] to rule the world by conquest; they mean to seize by armed force the
countries accessible to them, and thence to oppress the rest of the world by terror.
The extension of power they dream of is in no way either intelligent or moral; and
if God grants it to them, it will be for the woe of the world.45
The mistrust of Russian designs and fear of Russian power led to the Crimean War in
1854.46
45Astolphe Louis Leonard, Marquis de Custine, Custine's Eternal Russia: A New Edition of Journev
for Our Time, translated and edited by Phyllis Penn Kohler (University of Miami: Center for Advanced
International Studies, 1974), 145.
46.rhe desire to check and even destroy Russian power in Europe was essentially the British reason for
going to war in 1854. France, on the other hand, went to war with Russia in a conscious desire to destroy
the existing European state system which had kept France in a state of diplomatic isolation since the end
of the Napoleonic Wars. Norman Rich's book Why the Crimean War'!: A Cautionarv Talc (London:
University Press of New England, 1985) discusses in detail the origins of a war Rich argucs should ncvcr
have been fought.
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However, the war illustrated to both the French and British, as well as to Russia that
the tsar's empire was nowhere near as powerful as it seemed. Russia's concentration on
ideological themes and external threats had left its internal structure to stagnate. Behind
the mask of military might lay a backward economy, wretched communications system,
and a people still tied to serfdom.47 Following its defeat in 1856, Russia retreated from
an active role in European politics to concentrate on internal reform. Therefore, while
maintaining the autocracy was the prime interest, it was achieved through limited political
and social reform and limited contacts with the West.
It is interesting to note that while economic backwardness was a key factor in Russia's
defeat in the Crimea, it did little to enhance its economic well-being through its Polish
territories. The Congress Kingdom's share of the Russian Empire's wealth grew rapidly
and, in fact, Poland industrialized much earlier than central Russia. Indeed, Congress
Poland's Dabrowa Basin was the principle industrial concentration in the Russian Empire
until Russian industrialization began in the l880s.48 However, the success of Polish
industry caused Russian manufacturers to put pressure on the government to find a means
of stifling Polish competition.
Unfortunately for the Poles, their industry was heavily dependent on foreign,
particularly German, raw materials as well as foreign markets for its goods. The imperial
47Hugh Seton-Watson. The Russian Empire 180 loll) 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1%7). .\16.
48Norman Davies. God's Playground: A History of Poland. Vol. 2. 17l)5 to Present (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982). 107, 170.
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Russian government, in order to force Polish dependence on Russian raw materials and
Russian markets, placed prohibitively high tariffs on Polish raw material imports and
exports of finished goods to Germany. As a result of these protectionist poli<.:ies, by 1S90
seventy percent of Russian Poland's trade was with Russia.49
As a general rule, East Central Europe played a small role in Russian foreign policy
between the end of the Crimean War and the beginning of World War I in 1914. On the
whole that portion of Europe served as a buffer, or more appropriately a holding area,
against the increasing power of a unified German state and Russia's traditional rival
Austria-Hungary, while Russia turned its attentions toward the Balkans.
It was the conflicts between the three East European empires, particularly Russia and
Austria-Hungary, which led to the great European conflagration of 1914-191S, an event
which the Russian Empire did not survive. In the wake of its demise, its successor, the
Soviet Union, was forced by necessity of internal destruction and civil war to withdraw
within itself -- to stabilize the Soviet house. As an international pariah in the interwar
period, Soviet Russia was not trusted by the other powers. However, it was slowly able
to re-enter European politics.
Upon re-entry into the arena of European politics it became evident that there was
little difference between tsarist and Soviet motivations in foreign policy. While the goals
may have remained the same, the ideological framework had dramatically changed from
4'JIbid., 170. See alsoH.J. Habbakuk and M. Postan, cds.. The Cambrid!!e Ecollomic HislOrv of
Europe, Vol. 6, The Industrial Revolution and After: Incomes, Population, and Techno(o!!ical Ch:lI1!!e
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 834-835.
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conservative reactionary authoritarianism to leftist radical communism. However, the
importance ideology would play early on in foreign policy was based on the belief that
communist revolutions were on the verge of erupting throughout the rest of Europe. This
is evident in the formation of the Communist International (Comintern) which silently
worked for the overthrow of the very governments official Moscow dealt with on a daily
basis. As Leon Trotsky's theory of "continuous revolution" gave way to Joseph Stalin's
"socialism in one country," Soviet foreign policy toward Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland adapted. This is not to say that ideology did not playa role in Soviet foreign
policy, for certainly it did, only that ideology with regard to East Central Europe was
aimed at installing "friendly" (i.e., carbon copies of the Soviet government) in neighboring
states in order to prevent the infection of the Soviet people by Western ideals. In fact,
Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution indicates that while the Soviet Union would
advance socialism in some quarters of the world, it was equally, if not more, dedic..:ated
to maintaining the existing political order within its own borders.50
Given Stalin's acceptance of the fact that communist revolutions were not going to
occur in Western Europe as quickly as the early Bolsheviks had believed, his foreign
policy in Europe was aimed at protecting the gains of the 1917 revolution. This was to
50Article 28 stated, "The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring illlcrnational conditions
favorable for building communism in the USSR. safeguarding the state interests of thc Sovict Union.
consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national libcration and
social progress, preventing wars of aggression. achieving universal and complctc dis.u·mamcnt. and
consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with differcnt social systcms."
Quoted in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forccs." Problcms of
Communism 29 (May-June 1980): 3.
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be achieved through establishing a buffer between the Soviet Union and the rest of
Europe. As with tsarist Russia's aim of protecting its autocratic form of government,
Soviet Russia operationalized its national interest by arranging the four themes in the
same order: stable frontiers; alliance systems; dynastic lands; and economic gains.
In the early 1930s the issue of a stable western border became a serious issue as a
resurgent Germany appeared to be the future threat to Soviet Russia. As early as 1932,
the USSR signed numerous non-aggression treaties with its neighbors. By 1934, Soviet
Russia was seeking to expand these arrangements into an "Eastern Pact" in which the
security of Eastern Europe would be guaranteed by the USSR, France, and Germany. The
Soviet attempt failed, principally because Germany and Poland declined the offer. In the
end, in 1935, the Soviets opted for allIance with France closely followed by a separate
alliance with Czechoslovakia.5I
The events of the late 1930s also offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to recover
territory in Eastern Europe formerly held by the Russian Empire. Stalin may have
51 By the teons of these alliances, Russia agreed to come to the aid of Czt:choslovakia if attacked hy
Germany, but only if France acted first. Of course, if one views a map of the period one will see that the
only way Red Army troops could get to Czechoslovakia was through Poland or Rom.mia -- a route both
countries refused to approve. Therefore when France did nothing in response to Nazi-Gennany" s annexation
of the Sudetenland in August of 193R, Russia was under no obligation whutsoever to acl. In facl. as early
as June 1938, Maxim Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs. stated that "[tlhe Soviet Union had nothing
to do with [Czechoslovakia's] creation, taking no part in the struggle of imperialist interests Ii.e.. World W.u·
I]." Litvinov went on the say that Germany was merely taking steps to regain its pre-w:u' horders and
regain her rights taken away at Versailles. Later, Stalin was able to say, with un clement of truth. that he
had been willing to act in defense of Czechoslovakia if only France had maintained her treaty obligatiolls.
See Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Fuilure of Collective Security. IlJ34-1lJ3X ([thaca: Cornell
University Press, (984), 154.
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possessed the foresight in 1934 to see a rising Nazi threat and may have hoped the
Western European powers would oppose Hitler. In hindsight it seems he was right and
that after 1939 it was fairly clear that neither Britain nor France would do anything to
interfere with German expansion. Yet, as the Czech crisis of the fall of 193X gave way
to the Polish crisis of 1939, it appeared the West might finally oppose Hitler. Stalin
gambled on this fact and hoped to stall German advances in the East until the Soviet
Union could be fully armed. By then, Stalin hoped, Germany would be weakened by its
war with England and France and thus allow the Soviet Union to enter the war in time
to finish off Germany. The resulting non-aggression pact, signed only days before
Germany invaded Poland, was certainly an Unholy Alliance, but Stalin hoped to hold off
Germany for a time, as well as to receive substantial territory in Eastern Europe.52 As
a result of the Secret Protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Red Army troops
entered eastern Poland in late September 1939. Within the year the Soviet Union had
occupied and annexed the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as
Bessarabia. Incorporation of these territories gave the Soviet Union a substantial buffer
in the event of war with Germany.
As Stalin had hoped, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact only prolonged the
inevitable. However, it was not Stalin, but Hitler that struck the first blow. The June
52See George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Slalin (Boston: LillIe. Brown. and
Company, 1961; New York: Mentor, 1962),307-308. Also Adam B. Ulam. Expansion antl CocxiSlclll:c:
Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73, 2d cd (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, IlJ74). 270-276. Abo
Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich. Utopia in Power. trans. Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit
Books, 1986), 322-342.
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1941, German invasion forced Soviet Russia into a marriage of convenience with its
British and, later, American allies. Never fully trusting either Western ally, the Soviet
Union concluded the war with the idea of guaranteeing its own future security in the post-
war world. This security was linked to two objectives: a divided Gennany and Soviet
domination of East Central Europe.
In the grand scheme of Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary, in addition to East Germany, were the strategic keys. These were the ~ountries
which straddled the central European plain, ~he traditional highway into Russia. Given
the Soviet desire to prevent their own citizens from being infected by Western political
and social culture, it was imperative that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland be
subdued and ruled by governments modeled after the Soviet Union.
In maintaining its hold on East Central Europe it is easy to see how the four themes
were put to use. In maintaining a stable frontier, East Central Europe was not allowed
to deviate from the Moscow-directed governing position to the same extent as Romania
and Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, Tito was allowed to pursue "national communism" (and
in fact was ejected from the Cominform), while the Romanians were allowed to pursue
a relatively independent foreign policy because they were not strategically important to
the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Soviet troops were used in Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and nearly in Poland in 1956 and 1980 when each of these
nations attempted to deviate from Moscow's political direction. The Soviet Union was
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willing to use troops in these instances because Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland
were considered vital to the Soviet national interest.
Similarly, the Soviet Union created two international organizations to aid in controlling
Eastern Europe as a whole: the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The WTO was created in 1955 in response to
Western rearmament of the new Federal Republic of Germany and its entrance into the
North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO). However, unlike NATO, the WTO was
probably never meant to be a true military alliance. More than anything it guaranteed the
survival of the satellite communist regimes forced upon the East European states by
stationing Red Army troops in each state under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact.53
Just as the WTO was created in response to NATO, the CMEA was established in
1949 as an alternative to the Marshall Plan submitted by the United States as a means of
rebuilding war-tom Europe. By its charter, CMEA was supposed to coordinate the
economies of its members, as well as loans and economic aid. However, in reality it was
merely a means for Soviet exploitation of its East European satellites and retlected the
political division of Europe.54 While CMEA did enhance Soviet control over the East
European economies, this control was not maintained without its costs.55 At best CMEA
53Ulam, 577. This is also the thesis of Christopher D. Jones in his book Soviel InfluL:l\\:l: in Easlern
Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Pmeger. IlJXI).
54 . .Ibid., 436-437.
55Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe." in Soviel Policy in
Eastern Europe, ed. Sarah Meikeljohn Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press. IlJX4). 15lJ.
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was nothing more than a clearing house for second rate East European goods in return
for cheap Soviet raw materials. 56 On the other hand, while Eastern Europe benefitted
from large net exports of overpriced manufactured goods to the Soviet Union in exchange
for low cost energy and resources, this arrangement helped to preserve their excessively
energy-intensive industries.57 CMEA in effect inextricably tied the economies of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to that of the Soviet Union.
In comparing the foreign policies of tsarist and Soviet Russia it is evident that the
Russian national interest in East Central Europe has not changed nor has the form in
which foreign policy objectives have been achieved drastically altered over time. What
does the future hold now that the Soviet Union has dissolved? That is the lJ.uestion to be
answered next.
C. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN
THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER
In the wake of the demise of communism in the former Soviet Union it might seem
that the national interest of Russia would change, but this is not the case. The national
interest of the Russian state did not change with the death of tsarism and the rise of the
Soviet state and there is no reason to suspect the new government will alter that interest.
Indeed in May 1991, the Soviet foreign ministry expressed the national interest as:
56por example, Hungarian economists estimate that in 1984 Hungary paid as much ;l<; 60 percelll below
world market price for Soviet oil. John M. Kramer. "Eastern Europe and the 'Energy ShOl:k' of !l)l)0-l) 1."
Problems of Communism 40 (May-June (991): 86.
57Paul Marer, "Foreign Economic Liberalization in Hungary and Poland." American EUlIlomic Review
81 (May (991): 329.
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[T]he formation of a truly democratic society based on civil law in which the
political, social, economic, and spiritual interests and rights of all its members will
be safeguarded by the utilization of the material benefits possible in the present stage
of civilization.58
Even though the entity for which this interest was expressed no longer exists, it is still
an accurate assessment of the position in which Russia finds itself.
Undoubtedly the most severe issue in Russia today is the establishment of new
political and economic institutions and internal stability. Whether those new institutions
will be democratic (in the American understanding of the concept) is beyond the scope
of this study, but what is certain is those institutions must be established within the
political and social culture of Russia. In order for new institutions to be established and
reforms to take place, Russia must feel secure within its borders ano believe that reform
can take place without external interference.59
In addition, Russia must accept some foreign economic assistance in revitalizing its
sagging economy. There is no doubt that a successful economy aids in internal stability.
At the same time Russia may need to explore foreign markets for its goods and seek to
build or improve economic trade relations abroad.
58Suzanne Crow, "The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Assesses Its Course," Report on the USSR,
17 May 1991. 8.
591n an article in the Spring 1992 issue of Foreign Affairs. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev
wrote that the "'supertask' of Russian diplomacy in all areas is to make the utmost. I:oncrete wntribution
to the improvement of everyday life of Russian citizens." He went on the say that "lals r:u· as Russia is
concerned. we see our goals...in terms of releasing as many resources as possible and creating the ulmost
favorable conditions for the implementation of our socioeconomic rejimns." See Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia:
A Chance for Survival." Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 10. 13. (Italics supplied.)
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In an era of reform, East Central Europe serves to form a bridge between Russia and
Western Europe. In this regard, the Russian national interest remains one of maintaining
conditions in the region which will allow for successful political and economic
development The question, then, is how will Russia achieve these goals'! In a July
1991, interview, Andrei V. Fedorov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the RSFSR stated,
[T]he most important feature of Russian foreign policy, if it can be expressed in one
word, is pragmatism in order to stabilize internal life. This includes the idea that
foreign policy should play a very important role in ensuring foreign economic
assistance.6O
With regard to East Central Europe this statement can be operationalized in this order:
economic gain; stable frontiers; alliance systems; and dynastic lands.
This order represents a change in emphasis over the .tsarist and Soviet periods, but also
recognizes that in the post-Cold War period economic ability may be more important than
military capability.61 This may be particularly true for Russian foreign policy in East
Central Europe. Economic policy offers Russia two options in its use in that region: as
60Andrei Allakhverdov, "Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Interviewed" (text), Moscow Ra<.lio Rossii
Network in Russian. 1250 GMT, 3 July 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-
SOV-91-130, 8 July 1991): 81.
61lndeed, even those opposed to Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognize the importance of restoring
the Russian economy. The only real bone of contention seems to be disagreement ov\:r the pac\: of rdorn\.
The importance of foreign economic relations is also recognized by Yeltsin' s opposition. In February 11.)1.)2,
Chairman of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that "a major task of Russian foreign policy
and diplomacy is to contribute to the efforts to create an efficient and dynamically <.I\:vcloping \:collOmy."
Khasbulatov said this will enable Russia to take "a <.lignified place commanding respect in the world
community." But he also criticized the Yeltsin government, sl<lting this was a "weak point in the foreign
policy of the former USSR" and ha') failed to be "adequately retlccted" in Russian foreign policy thus far.
Suzanne Crow, "Khasbulatov On Foreign Policy," RFEiRL Daily Report, 27 Feoru:uy 11.)1.)2.
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a legitimate means of rebuilding its own economy; and as a means of applying pressure
on the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
In the first place, it is evident that there are still possibilities for trade to take place
between the two regions. The forty year economic ties between Russia and East Central
Europe through CMEA will not disappear overnight. For the Czechoslovaks, Hungarians,
and Poles, Russia represents a large untapped market for goods they cannot trade with the
West because of European Community restrictions. At the same time, there are products
which Russia desperately needs, especially food, which East Central Europe can provide.
On the other hand, the same forty year CMEA ties which may facilitate trade also
pose a hindrance, and in some respects still allow some Russian control over
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This is particularly true of energy resources. As
a result of Soviet domination, East Central Europe found itself a virtual slave to cheap
Soviet energy; a dependence which discouraged development of energy efficient industry.
East Central European dependence was particularly evident in 1989 as Soviet oil
production, and related oil exports, began to decline. This in tum led to fears among the
East Central European nations of a complete shut off in Soviet oil supplies.
Economic development, however, cannot take place if Russia does not believe its
external borders are secure. This is not to say that the WTO will return. but that Russia
needs some type of security arrangement with its neighbors. In the arena of grand
strategy, the independence of Ukraine would seem to indicate that Russia will want to
offset the power of that new nation by concluding some type of agreement with
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. However, this type of agreement may be many
years in the future. For the moment the Russian security interest in East Central Europe
is to guarantee the immediate stability of its Western frontier.
In sum, the Russian national interest in East Central Europe in the immediate post-
Cold War era is not that different from that of its tsarist or Soviet predecessors. Indeed,
Russia has always seen a need to protect its cultural and political institutions from
excessive Western influence, except in times of internal reform. As Russia begins to
rebuild its socio-political system its foreign policy in East Central Europe must be aimed
at allowing the successful completion of those reforms. These conditions can be fostered
primarily through economic relations, but also require the belief on Russia's part that its
internal affairs will be free from outside interference. Indeed, external security forms the
foundation for continued domestic reform. Without the guarantee of stable, secure
frontiers, Russia will be forced to abandon internal reform to face an external threat.
How Russia adequately guards against external threats is one of the key aims uf Russia
foreign policy in East Central Europe in the post-Cold War era.
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III
RUSSIAN SECURITY AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER
We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves
and remain strong. -- George C. -Marshall
A. INTRODUCTION
In March 1814, the victorious Allied armies entered Paris bringing an end, or so it
seemed, to nearly twenty-five years of war. At the head of this anny was not Kaiser
Franz of Austria, the constant enemy of France during the period, nor was it King George
III of England, whose annies had been the most successful in battle against the French.
Instead, at the head of the victorious column was Tsar Alexander I of Russia. His was
the largest army on the continent; his was the largest nation of all the great European
powers. These two factors alone catapulted the Russian Empire to a position of
preeminence in European relations. For the next fony years Alexander, and his successor
Nicholas I, would be the power to be reckoned with in the east.
At the end of that period, following a disastrous war, it was apparent Russia was not
as strong as it had seemed. Russia was so successful in its diplomatic ventures simply
because the other powers were awed by the size of its landmass and of its anny. When
war finally erupted between Russia and France and Great Britain in IX54, the truth
became known. Rotten from the inside, Russia's mask of strength was torn away to
reveal its real weakness. Overextended by expansion along its eastern frontier and its
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efforts to exert influence in Eastern Europe. Russian military might collapsed in a war
with modern industrial opponents.ti2
Following its defeat in the Crimean War. Russia retreated from European politics in
order to concentrate on internal reform. For almost twenty years Russia did not take an
active. aggressive role in European" politics.63 A seriously weakened Russia was forced
to tum to collective security to secure its position in the European balance. This is not
to say Russia had abstained from alliances in the P·lSt. Indeed. it had relied on such
combinations quite frequently since the mid-eighteenth century, particularly in time of
war, but now it seems Russia's security could only be guaranteed through allying itself
with other states against its new rival in the East -- Germany. Indeed, the longest
alliance. the Franco-Russian Alliance (1892) would expand into the fateful Triple Entente.
It can be said that this single combination ultimately led to the downfall of the Russian
Empire in the blood and fire of the Great War.
In 1945, the rejuvenated empire. in the form of the Soviet Union, found itself in a
similar position as its tsarist predecessor in 1814. Victorious Soviet armies entered Berlin
and found their military might unequalled in Europe. As a result of this power, the newly
independent Eastern European states. once the holdings of nineteenth century empires,
62Jelavich, ll1-il2.
63Indeed, between 1856 and 1876 the map of Europe and the balance of power were radically altered.
During the period the following key events occurred: in 1859 Italy was united: in 1866 Ihe Auslro-Prussian
War (Seven Weeks' War) left Prussia the dominant Germanic state: in 1867. a weakened Austrian Empire
was forced to restructure its government becoming the Austro-Hungarian Empire: and the Franco-Prussian
War (1870-71) secured a unified Germany's position as the most powerful nation on the continent.
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found themselves subservient to Soviet interests. After a series of provocative moves on
the part of the Soviets, the victorious Western allies saw no choice but to form an alliance
(NATO) against spreading Soviet power and then rearm their portion of Gennany. The
Soviets, seeking to ensure their own security and power, formed a similar pact among its
East European holdings. The resulting security arrangements kept the peace in Europe
for thirty-five years.
But almost as if it were a replay of tsarist Russia, the Soviet state was not nearly as
strong as it seemed. Eroded from the inside by an inefficient economy and strained by
the necessity to maintain its East European colonies by force, Soviet Russia found itself
weakened and facing retreat in European politics.
In post-Cold War Europe Russia is again faced with the necessity to undertake
comprehensive internal reform. However, the success of those reforms depends largely
on Russia's perception of external threats. Russia's perceptions of those threats, as well
as the perceptions of East Central Europe, will determine the nature of their security
needs. For Russia, however, there is also the added pressure of maintaining its position
as a major European power and avoiding sinking into the status of a "junior partner" with
Western Europe. This chapter examines the future Russian security requirements in East
Central Europe and possible security arrangements it may achieve with its fonner Warsaw
Pact satellites.
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B. BALANCE OF POWER AND ALLIANCES DEFINED
One of Russia's concerns in establishing its place in the new Europe is maintaining
its status as a great power. With the break up of the Soviet Union and Russia's rapid
retreat from European politics, there are those in Russia who are afraid the West will take
advantage of Russia's preoccupation with internal difficulties. In answering these fears,
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated in a March 1992, interview:
I do not think we will lose out by comparison with [the West] and end up the part
of some kind of weak or junior partner. So I always act on the assumption that
Russia is fated to be a great power by virtue of the size of its territory and its labor
and other resources.64
Given this statement it is evident Russia is concerned with its place in the European
system of states. An important factor in determining Russia's place in the European
system is the distribution of power within the system.
There have been many attempts at proving whether or not a so-called balance of
power exists in the world. It cannot be measured, nor is it necessarily visible, but there
is a natural tendency for the nations of the world to gravitate toward a more or less equal
distribution of power. Such activity on the part of the nations of the world is largely
based on perceptions, not necessarily the most accurate judgement of power, but celtainly
the most important. Perceptions are important because the balance of power arises as a
result of the aspirations of the members of the state system. Because each state is seeking
64Yladimir Tsvetov and Tatyana Krasnova. "Kozyrev Interviewed on Foreign Policy IsslIcs" (cxccrpts),
Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian. 1855 GMT, 3 March llJlJ2. Trans. hy FBIS. FBIS Dailv
Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOY-92-043, 4 March 19lJl): 31.
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to increase its power at the expense of another state or states, the perceptions of other
states within that system lead to policies aimed at maintaining the status quo. In this
regard the balance of power is nothing more than a logical extension of the equilibrium
naturally desired by all societies. All social systems, be they national or international,
desire stability and strive to maintain that stability within their system.(,5
However, if the social order is to be maintained, one must make certain assumptions.
First, it must assumed that the elements to be balanced are necessary to society or are
entitled to exist. Second, it must also be assumed that without a state of equilibrium
among them, one element will gain ascendancy over the others, encroach upon their
interests and rights, and may ultimately destroy them.!>() In other words, if we are to
understand the balance of power we must accept the proposition that without some state
of equilibrium the social system will be destroyed by the elements of the system.
These assumptions lead directly to a discussion of the elements of the European
balance of power. Such a condition has existed since at least the mid-eighteenth century
and is key to our understanding of past and future Russian participation within the
European state system. While Russia, like any other European state, seeks to increase its
power within the context of the system, it is equally aware that its security is directly
linked to the system's maintenance. If Russia is forced to act within the limits of a
clearly defined structure, one must understand the elements which perpetuate a balance
65Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 167.
66Ibid., 167.
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of power: a state system; a framework; homogeneity; and a rational means of estimating
power. These were the elements present during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
era of Metternich and Bismarck and realpolitik, but it seems evident these elements
continue to this day.67 Each is directly linked to Morgenthau's assumptions concerning
the balance of power.
The elements of the European balance of power are quite easily understood. The
balance of power cannot exist without 3. system of states, each recognizing the concepts
of "sovereignty, independence, nationalism, and legal equality."Ill! Obviously, without
a grouping of interacting states competing for power, there would be no need for a
balance. Within the context of the state system, there is also a framework, the recognition
that there are a specific number of actors within the system, each with a specific
territorial boundary. The element of homogeneity does not refer necessarily to a wmmon
culture, but to a common view of international law and strategy. In the European system
this common frame of reference is an important element in the ability of states to measure
relative power among the members of the system. In addition, if states are competing for
power, there must be a rational means of estimating power. Indeed, this may be the most
important of the elements since iris by definition the operative tenn in balancing power.
In order to balance power among nations there must be some means for nations to




measure their relative power among each other.69 The problem, of course, rests not in
how to go about measuring power, but in assigning values to those measures. Here, one
runs into the problem of perceptions. For example, how one state defines military power
may be the same as another state (e.g., number of division in a given army), but how
each state evaluates the quality of that measure may be quite different.
An understanding of the elements of the European balance of power leads to a
discussion of its aims. There are only three, but they are ranked in ascending order. One
cannot exist without realizing the previous aim. These clearly illustrate the reason for
maintaining a balance of power. If these aims are not achieved, the European system will
be destroyed. The first aim is to preserve the independence and survival of the individual
elements (i.e., states). This aim is basic to the realization of the second: preservation of
the state system. Indeed, the survival of individual states is best preserved within the
context of the state system. And finally, if the survival of individual states and the state
system is to be achieved, then it is critical that no one state should preponderate. 70 In
other words, if the system is to survive, then it is essential that n·o one element should
overpower all the others.
If maintaining the balance of power is necessary to the existence of the European
system, then how is the balance maintained? There are several methods, but for the




balance.7l Historically, this has been the most important means of maintaining the
balance of power. By this method, nations seek to augment their power by joining with
other nations. Alliances are not entered into freely, however, since a nation will only
enter into such an arrangement if the benefits to be gained outweigh the costs of entering
the alliance.72
Within the context of alliances it is important to distinguish between its types: general
and limited. These are important because of the necessity of understanding the context
in which a particular alliance treaty is concluded. General alliances are usually concluded
during war and for a limited period of time (i.e., the end of the war). Each party to a
general alliance is only concerned with winning the war and concluding a favorable peace
settlement. Limited alliances, on the other hand, are normally concluded during peacetime
and encompass only a portion of the interests of the parties.73
Having discussed the concepts behind the balance of power it is much easier to see
how Russian foreign policy in Europe has been conducted. Russia's past security has
been tied to the maintenance of the delicate balance and its position in it, while at the
7l0ther methods of maintaining the balance of power include: divide and rule; compensation: and
armaments. A discussion of these forms can be found in Morgenthau, Politics Amon!! Nations. 17X-I XI.
72Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 18 L Generally. the costs involved arc measured in terms of
how much of its sovereignty a nation is willing to surrender. In entering into an alliance in which a state
agrees to come to the other party's aid in the event it is attacked, the state gives up some of its ability to
decide for itself whether or not to go to war. Loss of sovereignty. as will be secn. was lhe key r"ctor in
the decision by Czechoslovakia. Hungary, and Poland not to sign bilateral agreemcnts with lhe Soviet Union




same time it has been forced to operate within the confines of that system. With the
break up of the Soviet Union and the reshaping of Europe, the balance of power is also
being reshaped. But even though the balance of power in Europe is shifting, the interests
of Russia will remain the same. One of those eternal interests is the security of its
borders. In these trying times for the Russian state, the security of those borders will be
more important than before; important in the sense that Russia must feel free from
external interference while it corrects it~ myriad internal problems.
c. THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER, WESTERN EUROPE, AND EAST CENTRAL
EUROPE
A major question for Russia in its relations with other European states in the
immediate post-Cold War era is how it will achieve external security in order to maintain
internal stability. Obviously its security is tied to that of Europe as a whole. but the
difficulty here is that generally Europeans are uncertain of what their security needs will
be in the post-Cold War era. An important factor in maintaining the balance of power
and security in a given region is the existence of a framework for nations to operate
within. In this context each nation knows its position and its relationship to other nations
within the system. But what happens when the system under which a group of nations
has been operating has been destroyed? That is the situation Europe finds itself in today.
The rapid decline of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the resulting breakup of the
WTO destroyed the European balance of power system in existence since the end of
World War II. These events, coupled with the rising power of a new unified Germany,
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the breakup of the Soviet Union, and French attempts to take the plal:e of American
power on the continent, have pushed Europe into a period in which a new system is
struggling to emerge. In this period, whose duration one can only guess, the key issues
will be where each nation fits into the system and how each nation will maintain its
security within that system.
While these issues are difficult for any nation to resolve, they are particularly
troublesome for Russia and the East Central European nations. Not only must they carve
their niche in the international community, but they must do so while conducting a
complete overhaul of their political, economic, and social systems. For Russia there is
the added complication of trying to act within the international community while still
attempting to define its own national character. However, Russia still must remain within
the European family of nations if it is to conduct any meaningful internal reform.
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties and complications a new European order will be
forged and both Russia and East Central Europe will have to participate and function
within that system.
The keys to Russian participation in the New European Order are the nations of East
Central Europe. Unfortunately for Russia, it is unable to control Czechoslovak,
Hungarian, and Polish actions to the extent it was able to prior to 1989. All three of the
East Central European states have made it quite clear they want to bel:ome PUlt of the
West, politically as well as economically. However, they also realize their security and
economic development are, to a certain extent, tied to the East and Russia. Indeed, the
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nations of East Central Europe see the greatest threat to their security as coming from the
East -- not from hordes of motorized infantry and armor of the Red Anny, but from
streams of refugees and the political and economic instability in the fonner Soviet Union
from which they are fleeing. The sentiment of East Central Europe was expressed by
Polish President Lech Walesa when he said the greatest danger to Polish security came
, from the economic situation, local conflicts in neighboring countries, and a "wave of
migrants from the East, which may destabilize the country."74
At the same time, the countries of East Central Europe see the same threat to Western
Europe and believe they have an important part to play in achieving greater European
security.75 However, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves increasingly
frustrated by what they see as Western Europe's inability to grasp the significance of the
74"Walesa Believes Army Should Be Part of NATO" (text), Warsaw PAP in English. 1129 GMT, 28
February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-041. 2 March IlJlJ2): 21-22. Walesa's
beliefs seem to be shared by the Polish people as well. An opinion poll conducted by "the sociological
centre (sic) in Sopot, northern Poland" on 26 January 1992 revealed 38 percelll or the respondenLs sLaLed
they believed Ukraine was the greatest Lhreat to Poland, while 28 percent named Germany and 16 percent
said Russia was the greatest threat. Forty percent said they believed the dissolution or the Soviet Union
was bad for Poland, and 62 percent said they felt there was a greater possibility of the use of nuclear
weapons by the republics of the former Soviet Union now than before, See "Ukraine Seen as 'Most
Dangerous Neighbor'" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1524 GMT, 14 February Il)lJ2. FBIS Daily Report.
Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-032, 18 February 1992): 31.
751n this regard, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier stated in a February IlJlJ2. interview,
"[S]ecurity of the West, too, now may depend more than ever before on what is going on in Cenlral and
Eastern Europe, and also in Asia." He also said, "If these democracies collapsed ano nalionalist. military,
religious, or other dictators came to power" a new division of the world into prospering democracies and
countries impoverished under authoritarian regimes would follow. "Dienstbicr Views Changing European
Security Needs" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2053 GMT, 7 February 1992. FB IS Daily Report Eastem
Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-029, 12 February 1992): 10.
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new threat.76 The West, though, is still suffering from the shock of the rapid decline of
the Soviet empire. For nearly fifty years European security has been defined by such
terms as sovereignty, alliance, interstate negotiation, and strategic deterren<.:e. Now that
the threat of Soviet expansion is gone, Western European strategic planners are having
a difficult time adjusting to the shadowy, vague threats posed in the new order.
Increasingly now it seems that greater European security will be found in such concepts
as domestic stability, legitimacy of political institutions, competence of political elites and
their ability to guarantee publjc order, law enforcement, and economi<.: welfare.77
Indeed, these are the very threats that will become more pervasive as Western Europe
moves closer to full economic and political unity.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves caught in the middle of the
transition between the Cold War system and the new emerging European system. Each
of them realizes the current reform process is hanging on a very thin balancing wire and
the slightest amount of internal unrest could topple the delicate political, social, and
economic system they are building. Because of the slow pace of change in the Western
security mentality and the threat posed by political and economic upheaval to the east,
the nations of East Central Europe have taken every opportunity to expound the position
761n an April 1992, meeting in Berlin with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszcwski. Western
European Union Secretary General Willem van Eekelen acknowledged Western sCl:urity institutions arc
"very slow" in responding effectively to the changing strategic situation in Europe. Wladyslaw Minkiewicz.
"Poland Seeks Special Relations With WEU," RFE(RL Daily Report. 2 April IlJlJ2.
77Jan Zielonka, "Europe's Security: A Great Confusion." International Affairs 67 (Winter IlJlJO/lJl):
128.
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they want to occupy in the new European security system. Or, perhaps it is better to say
they are very forceful about the position they do not want to occupy in the New European
Order. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland do not want to be a buffer zone between
the republics of the fonner Soviet Union and Western Europe, a position they occupied
during the interwar period, nor do they want, quite understandably, to return to Russian
domination.
Perhaps the greatest opponents of an East Central European buffer are the Poles. As
early as the Visegrad Summit in February 1991,78 President Walesa argued that East
Central Europe should not become a cordon sanitaire saying, "We shall not allow a
'sanitary cordon' to be created against anyone."79 This sentiment was echoed later that
month in a foreign policy speech before the Sejm by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof
Skubiszewski who said, "The main tenet of our security policy is to reject any idea of a
'buffer zone,' a 'gray area,' or neutrality."KO A year later, Walesa, again expressing his
7Sorhe Visegrad Summit was held in Hungary between Walesa. President Vaclav Havel of
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary's Prime Minister Joszef Antal!. The leaders met to pledge their mutual
support to each others' efforts to join Western European institutions. On 15 Febru'lfy, the leaders signed
the "Visegrad Declaration" in which they declared their goal was "the total integration [of the three
countries] into the [West] European political. economic. security, and legislative order." The Visegrad
Declaration also stated their common road to Europe was not meant to disrupt or limit cxisting relations
with any other state (Le.• the USSR). See Jan B. de Weydenthal. "The Visegrad Summit." Report on
Eastern Europe. 1 March 1991.28-29.
79Stephen Engelberg. "Three Eastern European Leaders Confer, Gingerly," The New York Timcs, 17
February 1991, A25.
80Jan B. de Weydenthal. "Building a Security System," Report on Eastern Europe, 14 Junc IlJlJl, 14.
A year later Skubiszewski still insisted East Central Europe should not be sccn as a buller zone against
instability in the former Soviet Union, but as a "participant in creating new stability and a ncw balancc in
Europe." Roman Stefanowski. "Genscher in Warsaw," RFE(RL Daily Report. :) February IlJlJ2.
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perception of the threat to Poland of anarchy and large-scale disorder in the former Soviet
Union, said that Poland alone would be unable to handle the possible wave of refugees
that might result.S !
While the East Central European nations are united in their opposition to the formation
of a buffer zone in their region, until recently there was no common solution as to the
best means to ensure their security. In addition, the variety of security options available
to them have complicated the decision making process over the past few years. In 1990,
the position of each nation on the security issue highlighted the various uptiuns: Poland
favored self-reliance bordering on non-alignment; Czechoslovakia favored a new pan-
European security system derived from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE); while Hungary favored increasing ties with NATO and eventually joining
that organization. At the same time, while they were looking for a European security
organization, the three countries signed bilateral treaties with each other.x2 This gave
rise to another option -- an "East Central European Pact." This option, however, has been
discounted and, in fact, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have tempered any
perceptions that they might be going it alone. They are afraid Western Europe may get
the impression that East Central Europe does not want to be integrated into Western
8!Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Walesa on Threat of Anarchy in CIS." RFE/RL Dailv Report. 26 March
1992.
82Vladimir Kusin, "Security Concerns in Central Europe." Report on Eastcm Europe. XMarch lYY l.
34-35.
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European organizations.83 In this connection, at the Visegrad Summit the leaders of the
three countries made it clear they would rather join existing Western European structures
rather than create separate political and economic institutions.84
However, since 1990, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have arrived,
independently, at the conclusion that of the existing European security institutions, only
NATO has the structures in place to guarantee the security of the East Central European
nations. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister liri Dienstbier summarized this belief in a
November 1991, interview when he said:
.. .it is in the interest of Europe to stabilize the murky security situations in its midst
through an institution that has proved its effectiveness and viability. By no means
do we insist that this role be played by NATO. The problem is that no other
effective and viable organization exists for this purpose.liS
At the moment Dienstbier's observation seems to be very true. The performance of
CSCE in finding a solution to the Yugoslav civil war has finally demonstrated that CSCE,
at least at this stage, is not an adequate conflict resolution body, nor does it have the
means to punish those members who deviate from its principles.xl> Indeed, CSCE was
83Celestine Bohlen, "Hungary Resisting Moscow's Shadow." The New York Timcs. 2H April IlJlJ!.
AlO.
~ngelberg. "Three Eastern European Leaders Confer." A25.
8S"Dienstbier on Role of NATO in Central Europe" (text), Pmgue Lidove Newill v in Czcch. XNovcmbcr
1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-220. 14 Novcmber IlJlJI): IlJ.
86The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" states the principles of CSCE as promoling frcc-markcl
economics. respect for the rule of law, upholding the rights of national minorities, trcalllleni of human rigllls
and fundamental freedoms as "the birthright of all human beings," and the holding of free ano fair cIcclions.
See Richard Weitz, "The CSCE's New Look," RFEtRL Research Report, 7 February [lJlJ2.2X.
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not designed as a collective security institution, but rather as a conflict prevention
organization. CSCE was intended to help reduce the likelihood of conflict between states
by promoting economic cooperation, and confidence- and security-building tasks. ll7
However, because of its success in this realm its membership has grown to the point
where its procedures make it ineffective in -dealing with many crises. The inherent
problem is that CSCE resolutions require unanimity and all members have the power to
veto any measure. There are now fifty-one members of CSCE,88 therefore it is easy to
see that with so many competing interests on any given issue it is difficult to gain a
consensus.
While CSCE membership has grown to such an extent as to be cumbersome, its real
fault as a collective security institution lies with the fact that it has no mechanism for
effectively dealing with conflict should its preventative methods fail, nor does it have any
means of punishing members who deviate from the principles they have promised to
uphold. Therefore, as a means of guaranteeing the security of Europe, beyond the
promise of individual nations to uphold its principles, CSCE is not adequate for the task.
87Richard Weitz, "The CSCE and the Yugoslav Conflict," RFEtRL Research Report. J I Janum'y 191.)2.
26.
8ll.rhe members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are: Albania. Armenia.
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus', Belgium, Britain. Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus. Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Estonia. Finland. France. Georgia, Germany. Greece. Hung:U)', Iceland, Ireland. Italy, Kazakhsl:lIl.
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Malta. Moldova, Monaco. Netherlands. Norway.
Portugal, Poland, Romania, Russia. San Marino, Slovenia. Spain. Sweden. Switzerland. Turkey. Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan. Vatican. and Yugoslavia.
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If CSCE is discounted as a means of guaranteeing European security, the region is left
only with the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Despite earlier statements
that WEU was not a security option because it was still trying to determine its European
role,89 the East Central European nations have been increasing contacts with that
organization. Indeed, in December 1991, the Political Affairs Committee of the WEU
recommended that representatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland regularly
participate in WEU Council sessions that deal with East Central European security.9lJ
Of the East Central European states, Hungary has been the strongest advocate of WEU
membership. During an official visit to Budapest in February 1992, WEU Secretary
General Willem van Eekelen met with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszinszkey to
discuss Hungarian desires to establish closer ties with security structures of a future
United Europe where the WEU becomes a link between Europe and NATO.91 At a
meeting of the Visegrad Three defense ministers with French Defense Minister Pierre
Joxes in May, Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur said that Hungary wants to join the
WEU as soon as Hungary becomes an associate member of the European Community
(EC).92 Earlier in the year, at speech in Berlin in March, Hungarian Deputy Defense
89Kusin, "Security Concerns in Central Europe," 37.
90"Trilateral Security Ties With WEU Proposed" (text). Budapest Magyar Hirla() in Hungarian.
3 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBlS-EEU-lJ2-237. 10 December
1991): 1.
91Alfred Reisch. "WEU Secretary General Visits Hungary." RFEtRL Daily Report. II.) February 11.)1.)2.
92Alfred Reisch, "Visegrad Three Military Meeting," RFEtRL Daily Report. II May 11.)1.)2.
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Minister Rudolf Joo appealed to the WED to help Eastern Europe fend off the security
threats posed by the civil war and economic chaos in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet
Union.93 However, these overtures do not necessarily mean Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland are placing WEU above NATO, but more likely represents an effort to
hedge their bets by contacting both security organizations. Of course, this puts the East
Central European nations in the middle of the ongoing debate between WEU and NATO
over the future of European security,94 but at this stage Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
93Edith Oltay, "Hungarian Secretary Asks for WEU Protection." RFE/RL Dailv Report. I April IlJlJ2.
'J4.rhe debate between NATO and the WEU actually involves three areas: which organization can
guarantee European security; the establishment of the WEU as the "European pillar" of NATO; and out of
area missions. In the early days following the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe.
NATO officials ridiculed the effectiveness of the WEU and CSCE as security arrangements. At the time,
NATO said that Europe alone was not strong enough to balance Soviet power. As for CSCE. too many
members, too many different cultures and desires, as well as every member possessing veto power made
it certain nothing would get done. Yet, as early as February 1991. a consensus was forming that the WEU
should be the European pillar of NATO. WEU Secretary General van Eekelen argued thai the WEU had
an advantage over NATO in that the WEU could go where NATO cannot; i.e.. the Middle Easl. Africa. and
Eastern Europe. Indeed, later that year van Eekelen stated, "One of NATO's problems is thai today every
foreseeable conflict will erupt probably out of NATO's area. Eastern Europe. the Middle East. or North
Africa might be such places."
The U.S. supports a European organization that can bear more responsibility in European securily and
can coordinate with NATO. However, the U.S. also argues that a "caucus" approach \0 thl: WEU. or thl:
creation of a bloc within a bloc. will split NATO. The U.S. is supported in this view by Britain. In
October 1991. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Fran\;ois Millerrand Sl:nt a Iclll:r to
other European leaders proposing the WEU become the pillar of a joint European deknsl: and Sl:curily
policy. The British immediately challenged this proposal as a threat to NATO and also said that thl: WEU
would lead to reduced U.S. commitment in Europe. Italian Foreign Minister Gianni dl: Michdis. on lhe
other hand, said there was "no contradiction" between the WEU and NATO. Kohl may have had British
objections in mind when he told the Bundeslag before he left Bonn for the November IlJlJ I. NATO summit
in Rome, that NATO, not the WEU, remained "the unrenounceable foundation for a stable security policy
in Europe." This sentiment was endorsed at the December 1991, EC meeting in Maaslridll whl:rl: the EC
endorsed the WEU, but said it would remain closely tied to NATO. NATO SCCrl:lary Gcncral Manfred
Worner echoed the EC statement shortly thereafter when he said. "It must he acknowlcdgl:d thai IWO
military organizations exist in Europe which, following the spirit of Rome and Maastrichl. mutually
complement each other."
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, therefore. find themselves at lhe he:u·t the (khatt:. espl:cially
since they are located in a region outside NATO's area of responsibility. but incrl:asingly importanl to
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Poland believe they must make every effort to become a part of some pan-European
security entity. Indeed, East Central Europe believes pan-European security is essential
to stability within their own region. Hungarian Prime Minister Joszef Antall summed up
this feeling in December 1991, when he said, "Expanding the all-European security
system, of which NATO and the U.S. military presence in Europe, establishing an
equilibrium, are the stable guarantee, is the only way to prevent the region from sinking
into further conflicts."9S However, East Central European efforts to join a security
organization are hampered by perceptions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland that
NATO is not making every effort to bring the region under NATO's security umbrella.
At the same time, the East Central European nations may not fully understand
NATO's reasoning for not accepting them immediately into the organization. Initially,
NATO officials were reluctant to extend security guarantees to the east for two reasons.
On the one hand, there is the difficulty in handling the minority and nationality disputes
European security. The debate between the WEU and NATO over future European sel:urity has yet to be
resolved, but the crisis in Yugoslavia may force a resolution of the issues.
See Richard Weitz, "NATO and the New Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe. 24 May IlJlJl.
33-34; also Francine S. Keifer, "Europe Pushes for new Security Organization," Thc Christian Sdenl:e
Monitor, 26 February 1991,6; also William Tuohy. "Dutchman Places Hopes on Europe-Only Allianl:c,"
Los Angeles Times, 2 July 1991. H3; also Alan Riding. "Mittermnd Joins Kohl in Proposing a European
Army," The New York Times, 17 October 1991, AI; also Ian Murray, "Kohl Says Alliancc is Key Elemcnt
in Defense Strategy, "Times (London), 7 November 1991. 14; also Alan Riding, "Europe at Crossroads."
The New York Times, 12 December 1991. AI, A8; and Laszlo Mecs, "Woerner on Hungarian Support for
WEU, NATO" (excerpt), Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian, 1700 GMT, 13 Del:l~mber IlJlJl.
Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-241, 16 Dewnber IlJlJl): IlJ.
95F. Lukyanov, "Hungary's Antall Interviewed on Union Ties" (text), MOSl:OW /;V('SliWl in Russian,
7 December 1991. Trans, by FBIS. FBlS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-lJl-137. !O Del:cmber
1991): 9.
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within and between all the East European nations. As one NATO diplomat said, "If
there's a problem with the Turkish population in Bulgaria or trouble between the Czechs
and Slovaks, you think NATO is going to send in the troops to keep the peace? Forget
it. ,,96
On the other hand, until recently there was still the Soviet Union to consider. In 1989
and 1990, NATO did not want to upset the Soviets by giving them the impression NATO
was trying to isolate them from Europe. This was particularly true at a time when NATO
was constantly assuring the Soviet Union that the alliance was not a security threat to
them.97 Of course, the significance of East Central European desires to join NATO was
not lost on the Soviets. As one commentator said of the region's desire to join NATO:
These statements should be deplored. Even associated membership in NATO of
countries sharing borders with the USSR cannot but affect the Soviet defense
policy.98
NATO's concern over Soviet reactions to any expansion of NATO membership was still
evident in June 1991, when NATO offered to strengthen its political and military ties with
Eastern Europe. At the time, NATO declared that any "coercion or intimidation" aimed
96Weitz, "NATO and the New Eastern Europe." 33. The civil war in Yugoslavia illustrates the
unwillingness of NATO to get caught in the middle of ethnic and religious contlicL,>in Europe. Allhough
the May 1992, decision by NATO defense ministers to allow NATO forces to be used as peacekeepers in
Bosnia-Hercegovina represents a significant change in NATO philosophy and perhaps not a little frustration
at the inability of any other security organization or nation to conclude a successful peace. the nations of
Western Europe are still wary over becoming involved in a situation which !()r them might become a
Vietnam or Lebanon.
97Ibid., 32.
93Albert Balebanov, "European Security After Pact Viewed" (text). Moscow TASS in English. 1007
GMT. I April 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBlS-SOV-91-062. I April 19l)!): 7.
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at Central or Eastern Europe would be treated as matter of "direct and material concern."
However, NATO tempered this statement by stating it was not meant as a challenge to
the Soviet Union, but rather to satisfy the security concerns of the fonner Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact states.99
There is also, perhaps, a third reason NATO has been slow to extend security
guarantees to East Central Europe -- the continuing debate within NATO concerning out
of area missions. Although recently "out of area" has become more and more associated
with NATO security concerns outside Europe, it must be remembered that, strictly
speaking, all of Eastern Europe is outside NATO's area of responsibility. This problem
may have led President Bush to rebuff Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's October
1991, plea that Eastern Europe be granted associate membership in NATO. According
to Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs,
associate status would require renegotiation of the NATO treaty and would not be in the
interest of NATO or Eastern Europe. lOu At a press briefing, an administration official
summed up this sentiment when he said, "NATO extends its security guarantees to
members. It doesn't extend them to non-members. ,,101 However. at the November
99Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Ties to Ease Security Concerns in Eastern Europe." The New York
Times, 7 June 1991, Ai.
IOO"Havel Rebuffed on NATO Links," Times (London), 24 October 1\)91. 14.
101Peter Grier, "Eastern Europeans Wary of Neighborhood Conmcts," The Christian Science Monitor.
25 October 1991,7. Nevertheless, it seems. now, that NATO's concept of "out of area" is out or date. The
civil war in Yugoslavia illustrates "out of area" can be close to home and that NATO cannot ignoreconllicts
outside traditional NATO boundaries. Michael Evans. "Conmct Forces West to Rethink Alliance Strategy."
Tiines (London), 161anuary 1992. 7.
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1991. NATO summit in Rome Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis said that
NATO should give security guarantees to the former Non-Soviet WTO members. De
Michelis argued that even if the Eastern European nations cannot be NATO members.
NATO should find a way to involve them. 102
It seems NATO has found a means of including Eastern Europe in the greater
European security process through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). This
development has been largely due to changes within the Soviet Union, or more
appropriately its dissolution. In September 1991, NATO General Secretary Manfred
Worner said he believed this could happen because in the wake of the failed coup attempt
hard-line pressure on Eastern Europe. as well as fear of NATO. may disappear. 1IJ3 As
a result of changing attitudes within the Soviet Union. on 2 October 1991 German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III
proposed the establishment of the NACC as a NATO non-defense auxiliary.ltl4 The
council would serve as a forum for officials from NATO. Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union105 to discuss political and military matters. lOll This proposal was welcomed by
102Michaei Evans~ "NATO Comes to Tenns With New Europe." Times (London). 7 November IlJlJl.
14.
103Alfred A. Reisch. "New Prospects for Hungarian-Soviet Relations," Report on Eastern Europe,
27 September 1991.9.
I04Grier, 7.
105With the breakup of the Soviet Union each of the former republics. except Georgia. is a member
of the NACC. The NACC consists of: Armenia. Azerbaijan. Belarus', Belgium, Britain. Bulg:u'ia, Canada.
Czechoslovakia. Denmark, Estonia. France. Gennany, Greece. 'Hungary. Iceland. !laly. Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia. Lithuania. Luxembourg. Moldova. Netherlands, Norway, Poland. Portugal. Romania.
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the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish foreign ministers in Cracow on 5 October where
they stated, "there is a need to create conditions for the direct inclusion of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the activities of the [NATOI alliance."lo7 The
inaugural meeting of the NACC was held in December 1991, and the foreign ministers
fIrst met in March 1992. The new organization promises to improve the political and
military ties between NATO and Eastern Europe, but for East Central Europe it is only
the beginning of a long, gradual drive toward full integration.
However, NATO still continues to resist attempts by the East Central European states
to become full members of the organization. Indeed, in March 1992, NATO Secretary
General Womer said that NATO relations with Eastern Europe are part of a "dynamic
process that progresses with time." Womer also said there is a "possibility" of NATO
membership for Eastern Europe. lOs Even though contacts continue at the parliamentary
and military levels, this does not satisfy a region which sees itself caught in a power
vacuum between the East and the West. Unable to adequately guarantee their security
between themselves against the unrest and turmoil to the east, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland feel they must convince the West the region is important to Western security
Russia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan. Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the United Slates.
106 .Jan de Weydenthal, "The Cracow Summit," Report on Eastern Europe. 25 October IlJlJ I. 2X.
107Ibid., 28,
108Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Woerner: East European States Could Join NATO." RFE/RL Daily Report.
10 March 1992.
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in order to be included in a Western security organization. However, at the same time
they cannot afford to alienate the large neighbor to the east, Russia, who historically has
seen East Central Europe as the heart of its security interests in Europe.
D. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIAN SECURITY IN EUROPE
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves in an unenviable position;
caught between a resurgent Germany and a declining Russia, they are at the center of a
power and security vacuum in Central Europe 109 Because of this vacuum, the East
Central European nations realize more than ever that their security can be ensured only
through maintaining good relations with both the East and the West. 111I However, just
as the East Central European nations reject the formation of any type of buffer zone in
the region between Russia and the West, they also reject any resumption of Russian
dominance in the region. 1l1 This possibility and the memory of Soviet occupation under
the auspices of the WTO prompted the drive to join NATO, WEU, or any other security
organization.
At the same time, however, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have been hampered
by the fear of upsetting their large neighbor to the east. Even though troops of the former
1U91n understanding the region's predicament. Hungarian Prime Minister Anl4l11 said. "Wc would find
it detrimental if between a unified Germany and the Soviet Union. there were a so-called security vacuum."
See Bohlen, "Hungary resisting Moscow's Shadow," A10.
llUJiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security." Foreign Policy ~3 (Summer IlJlJI): 121.
• lllln this regard, on 29 March 1992 Poland's President Walesa told Italian Presidcnl Francesco
Cossiga, on a stop in Warsaw enroute to Moscow. thal Eastern Europe "will never accepl Russian
domination." See Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Walesa Calls for 'Parallel' Alliance." RFE(RL Dailv Report.
30 March 1992.
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Red Army are being withdrawn and the region is separated from Russia by a newly
independent Ukraine, the East Central European nations realize the region is important
to Russian security interests in Europe.
The problem for Russia, however, has been how to approach security building with
their former satellites. The collapse of the WTO caused many in the Soviet Union to fear
for its security. To some, a buffer is still required to separate Russia from a newly
unified Germany.ll2 But, nearly two years after the reunification of Germany it appears
the real threat to Russian security is not German power, but internal instability in Russia
and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. A threat of this type re4uires an
entirely different security arrangement than would a politically and economically stable
state. For Russia, then, it is important to ensure that no foreign intervention should
interrupt the time consuming reform process that it must undergo.
Given the Russian historical view of East Central Europe as either a buffer against the
West or a highway of Western influence or invaders, it is important at this stage in
Russia's rebirth that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland become a highway for Western
technology and aid to build a new Russia. At the same time, the region must remain a
buffer against any hostile intervention in Russia. This is not to say there is such a threat,
but it is certainly in Russia's interest to guard against even the possibility of foreign
intervention. There is no doubt that this was Russia's, or at the time the Soviet Union's,
112Leonid Mlechin, "A New Relationship is Needed" (text). Moscow New Times in English. 20
February 1990. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-90-047, l) March !l)l}O): 54.
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idea when it first approached its former satellites about a new security arrangement. In
the period immediately following the demise of the WTO, the Soviet foreign ministry
presented each of its fonner WTO allies with a proposed bilateral agreement, essentially
a non-aggression treaty, but with the provision that neither party join "alliances that
oppose each other." ll3 Almost with one voice the East Central European nations
rejected these treaties as infringing upon their sovereignty and in effect "Finlandizing" the
region. In rejecting the treaty language Czechoslovak President H,lvel stated that
Czechoslovakia did not want to join any alliance aimed at the Soviet Union, but the treaty
language was unacceptable because it restricted Czechoslovakia's freedom of action --
especially since it wanted to join the European Community.114 Similarly, Hungarian
Prime Minister Antall stated Hungary wanted to join whatever group it wished, but AmaH
also said he thought the Soviet motivation for the treaty language was to set up a security
zone in Eastern Europe and to prevent the Soviet Union from being isolated. I 15
113Jan Petranek, "Pankin on CSFR Treaty. Disarmament" (text), Prague Lidove Novinv in Czcch, 4
October 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOY-lJl-llJR. II Octoocr IlJlJl):
II.
114.rhe significance of the EC reference lies in the fact that many nations already in the EC view that
organization as the basis for a future pan-European security arrangement. The spirit. if not the intent. of
a treaty such as the one originally proposed by the Soviets would have prevented Czechoslovakia, or any
other Eastern European country for that matter, from joining the EC. This might have been very detrimental
to East Central Europe since each of the countries sees EC membership as critical to its ewnomic rewvery.
(See Chapter IV.) "CSFR's Havel Cited on New Treaty With USSR" (text), Moscow I=vesliv(/ in Russian ..
I May 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-lJl-OR4. I May IlllJl): IX.
115Bohlen, "Hungary Resisting Moscow's Shadow." AIO.
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With "Finlandization" rejected by its fonner satellites, the Soviets continued to
negotiate bilateral treaties with them. But once the language concerning alliances was
removed, the way was clear for the signing of bilateral treaties between East Central
Europe and Russia. On 3 October 1991, then Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin and
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier initialled a "Treaty of Good Neighborliness,
Friendly Relations, and Cooperation."1l6 However, the breakup of the Soviet Union
prevented the fonnal signing of the treaty. A new treaty, based on the October 1991,
treaty, but of shorter duration (ten years rather than the fifteen originally agreed upon),
was initialled on 18 February 1992 and signed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and
Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia on 1 April 1992.117 A similar treaty had been signed
by Russia and Hungary in December 1991. 11S As for Poland, a treaty was initialled on
2 December 1991, but was not to be signed because of the breakup of the Soviet
Union.1l9 Later, President Walesa refused to go to Moscow until an agreement had
been reached concerning the withdrawal of fonner Red Army troops from Poland.
116Jan Obnnan, "Treaty Signed with the Soviet Union." Report on Eastern Europe. I Novcmber 199 I.
1.
1l1"'Priendship Treaty' With Russia Outlined" (text). Prague CSTK in English. 2042 GMT. IX February
1992. PBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ2-035, 21 February 1992): 44-45. Also Barbara
Koulik, "Havel in Russia," RFE(RL Daily Report, 1 April 1992.
11S"Russia, Hungary Sign Pirst Interstate Treaty" (text), Moscow All-Union Radio M(l\,ak Nctwork in
Russian, 1000 GMT, 6 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBlS-SOV-91-
235,6 December 1991); 65.
119"Makarczyk Hails 'Splendid Treaty' With Russia" (excerpt), Warsaw Radio Wars:aw{/ Network in
Polish, 1105 GMT, 11 December 1991. Trans. by PBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastcrn Europc (FBIS-EEU-
91-239); 23.
65
However, by March 1992, an agreement had been reached between Russia and Poland and
in May Walesa agreed to travel to Moscow where a treaty was signed on 22 May.120
However, bilateral agreements could be only the beginning of Russian security
arrangements in Europe. While the bilateral treaties satisfy the immediate need to secure
their western borders, they do not satisfy the need to find a means of entering the
120The question of the disposition of fonner Soviet troops on Polish soil has been a major bone of
contention between Russia. who claims to control those troops. and Poland. The dispute arose. not only
over the timetable for the withdrawal. but also over how many troops have already left and who is
financially responsible for them. In January 1992, Russian Ambassador to Poland. Yuriy Kashlev. said.
"Nothing can alter the 15 November [1992] deadline for the withdrawal from Poland of all \:ombat troops
from the fanner Soviet Anny's Northern Group of Forces." He also claimed 10.000 troops had already
departed in 1991. This figure was disputed by the Poles and a spokesman for General Zdzislaw OSlrowski,
the Polish official responsible for monitoring fonner Soviet troops in Poland. said in February 1992. that
only 4.387 fonner Soviet troops had departed Poland between April and September 1991. The spokesman
also claimed there were still 45.000 former Soviet troops still stationed in 22 garrisons in Poland. The
problem for the Poles is that the Soviets never told them how many troops were stationed in Poland.
Nevertheless, on 26 January 1992 the Northern Group of Forces commander. General Viktor Dubrynin. said
that all fonner Soviet units would be out of Poland by the end of 1993. All combat troops will depart by
15 November 1992, but 6.000 transport and signal troops will remain behind to support the withdrawal of
fanner Soviet troops from eastern Gennany.
On 16 April 1992 it was announced that an agreement had been reached concerning financial
arrangements for the fanner Soviet troops. Although the terms of the agreement were secret. il was implied
that the Poles agreed to finance the transfer and resettlement of former Soviet troops using profits from
Polish-Russian joint ventures to be established at the fonner Soviet facilities in Poland. Later in April
Russian First Deputy Defense Minister. General Pavel Grachev. said that out of the $400 million expected
from the sale of fonner Soviet military facilities in Poland. one-quarter would go 10 Poland as compensation
for environmental damage. while the rest would be used to construct housing for returning troops. The
treaty. however. has not been well received in Poland. Many Poles see Russia taking advantage of Polish
desires to get the fonner Soviet troops off Polish soil whatever the cost. One commentator wrote. "The
Russians have managed to negotiate an agreement that allows them to remain in Poland forever." He also
claimed there was a chance Poland might become a Russian "half-colony.
See Louisa Vinton, "Confusion Over Soviet Troop Withdrawal." RFE(RL Dailv Report. 23 January
1992; also Wladyslaw Minkiewicz. "Soviet Troops To Leave Poland By End of IYY3," RFE(RL Daily
Report. 27 January 1992; also Roman Stefanowski. "Troop Withdrawal From Poland Lagging." RFE/RL
Daily Report. 21 February 1992; also Roman Stefanowski and Louisa Vinton. "Poles to Help Finance Troop
Withdrawal?" RFE(RL Daily Report. 16 April 1992; also Roman Stefanowski. "Progress in Polish-Soviet
Military Talks," RFE(RL Daily Report. 22 April 1992; and "Daily Claims Russians Intent on Slaying" (text).
Warsaw Nowy Swiat in Polish, 21 April IY92. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report Eastern Europe (FBIS-
EEU-92-083.29 April 1992): 32.
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European family of nations. Shut out of EC, and thus the WEU, for the foreseeable
future by its myriad economic woes, and whatever political and military power Russia
might have offset in the CSCE by the shear size of that organization, Russia must find
another means of flexing whatever political muscle it may have in Europe. Therefore,
of the existing security institutions only NATO is left.
But does Russia really want to be a member of NATO? There are arguments inside
Russia on both sides of the issue. The most extreme argument against joining NATO is
that it would be the "last step on the road to turning Russia into the bourgeois colonialist
bloc's junior partner.,,121 Similar claims have been made against the NACC. One
commentator wrote:
It is through the Cooperation Council that NATO would like to attract East European
countries and all the former Soviet republics to itself (as second-class partners), to
keep under control all military questions, connected with them and to influence
policy. 122
121B. 2anegin, "NATO Entry May Have 'Dangerous Consequences'" (text). Moscow Pravda in
Russian, 18 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-lJ2-()l5. 23
January 1992): 25. Despite its extreme appeal to old-time communists. this statement. anLi the :uticle in
general, does reflect the view among some that NATO represents anti-Russian sentiment. Just as we in the
West came to see the WTO as the embodiment of the enemy, so did those in the East vi<.:w NATO. It is
no wonder that there are those who would see Russia's membership in NATO as the ultimate humili:ltion.
However, it is interesting to note that an April 1992. meeting between Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov.
chief of the CIS Joint Anned Forces Information Directorate, and Erica Bruce. chief of NATO's Information
and Press Administration, paid particular attention to this issue. The meeting stressed the problems of
overcoming Cold War thinking and eliminating the vestiges of an enemy image in people's minds and
replacing it with the image of partners. "CIS. NATO Military Information Aides Confer" (t<.:xt). Mosww
Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, 11 April 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. C<.:nlral Eurasia (FBIS-
SOV-92-075, 17 April 1992): 7.
122A. Baryshev, "Former USSR States Seek NATO Membership" (text). Moscow ,";O\'('{S/.:.ill'iI Nossil'iI
in Russian, 18 April 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-lJ2-07lJ. 23
April 1992): 4. Emphasis added.
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The same commentator attacked what he called:
...Washington's plan to expand NATO's sphere of operation through the structure of
the Cooperation Council and, by preserving its own leading role in the alliance, to
advance the idea of a "pax Americana" into the plane of practical fulfillment in the
Eurasian direction with the help of "second class" or associate members of the
organization. 123
Perhaps the most convincing argument against NATO membership, however, came
from Aleksei Arbatov in an 11 March 1992 article in Nezavisimuvu Cazeta. In the
article, Arbatov argues that Russia does not need NATO, nor does NATO need Russia.
On this point he says:
If.. .it is supposed that the United States or West Europe would guarantee Russia's
security, then this...is unrealistic. With its Army of 3 million men with tens of
thousands of nuclear weapons, Russia faces no serious military threat from outside
that it would need the West's help to repulse. 124
In fact, he argues, if Russia joins NATO, the organization will die because its raison
d' etre is gone. In other words, Russian membership is incompatible with the aims of
NATO. 125
However, Arbatov's argument misses two important points. First, while he is correct
in asserting there is no serious external threat to Russia, he discounts the threat posed by
economic and political conflict within Russia itself. In addition, he is also correct in
123Ibid., 5.
I24Aleksei Arbatov, "NATO Membership Seen as Unlikely Prospect" (text). Moscow Nt::avisimav(/
Gazeta in Russian, II March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOY -92-
048, II March 1992): 21.
125Ibid.. 21.
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saying that Russian membership in NATO is incompatible with its raison d' etre as
derived in 1949, but he ignores NATO's realization that the threat it was formed to
counter no longer exists and that in order to survive and remain a viable security
organization it must alter its mission.
While Russia hesitates to join NATO at this point for its security guarantees, Russia
does see an important role for NATO in helping reform many aspects of Russian society.
As early as November 1991, members of the Russian parliament acknowledged their
interest in seeking agreements with NATO for assistance in converting Russia's military-
industrial complex to the civilian sector. 126 Similarly, Commander- in-Chief of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Evgenii
Ivanovich Shaposhnikov indicated in February 1992, that he believed the most likely
NATO assistance is in the area of military reform "because the armies of the NATO
countries already have such features as professional armies, for example, and contract
service."127 Likewise, in March 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that
126"Government To Seek NATO Membership" (text). Moscow Interfax in English. 2000 GMT. 14
November 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-221. 15 November IlJlJI): SlJ.
127Doug Clarke. "Shaposhnikov On Cooperation With NATO," RFE/RL Dailv Report. 25 February
1992. Sbaposhnikov made this statement in a 24 February interview prior to the arrival in Moscow of
NATO Secretary General Womer for talks with Commonwealth of Independent States politil:al and military
leaders. The following day, Worner stated that NATO would not get involved ill the illlcrnal debate over
the reshaping of former Soviet armed forces. Stephen Faye. "NATO-CIS Talks." RFE/RL Dailv Report.
26 February 1992.
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"[w]e consider the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to be another mechanism to help
us join the international community. ,,128
Given Russia's security needs, however, it does not necessarily need NATO, or any
other military organization for that matter, to guarantee its European security. At this
point those needs are met by the bilateral agreements signed with the individual East
Central European nations. The kind of security guarantees Russia needs more than any
other are guarantees that its economic and political reforms will succeed. This can only
be accomplished through contacts with all the developed countries, but in Europe
particularly through organizations which it has some chance of joining.
E. CONCLUSION
In 1992, Russia finds itself once again facing a New European Order. As in 1856 and
again in 1918, Russia cannot be sure where it will fit in the new order. However, what
is certain is that if Russia is to compete in the European system in the future it must
withdraw from an active role in European politics for the near term in order to correct its
many socio-economic woes. Nevertheless, external security is just as important, if not
more so, now than when Russia was a strong European power.
However, the nature of the threat to Russian security has changed. The threat of
external invasion has been replaced by a threat from internal unrest and instability.
Security from this threat cannot be achieved through military alliances, but through
128yuriy Sidorov. Valeriy Shashkov. and Georgiy Shmclyov. "Kozyrcv On North Atlantic Council
Meeting" (text). Moscow TASS in English. 1546 GMT. 10 Murch IlJlJ2. FB IS Dailv Report. Central
Eurasiu (FBIS-SOV-92-048. II March 1992): 20.
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development of political and economic institutions which meet the basic needs of the
citizens of a given nation. Given the changing nature of the threat to Russian security,
membership in a larger pan-European security arrangement is not necessary at this stage.
Russia's immediate external security concerns can be met through a series of bilateral
agreements with each of its former WTO allies and the other European republics of the
former Soviet Union.
The task for Russia now is to rebuild its shattered economy so that internal unrest and
instability does not grow within Russia and spill over into neighboring states. It is in this
realm, more so than external security, that the nations of East Central Europe will play
a major role in Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War era.
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IV
REALISM IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER:
THE ECONOMICS OF RUSSIAN AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN
RELATIONS AFTER THE WARSAW PACT
The new god of war was born in the workshops:
he is Mars-Mechanized. -- B.H. Liddel Hart
A. INTRODUCTION
In the heady days following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
the newly emerging governments in the region seemed bent on re-establishing their
historic ties with Western Europe. But more important than the cultural ties between the
two regions was the simple fact that the nations of Western Europe had the economic
resources their Eastern neighbors so desperately needed to rebuild their shattered
economies. Given the resentment toward the Soviet Union within East Central Europe,
the newly independent nations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland seemed prepared
to turn their collective backs on their former colonial masters and trust their futures to
each other and the West. But two years later it now appears that while Western Europe
was willing and able to give moral support to emerging capitalism in East Central Europe,
it was less willing, for whatever reasons, to provide the type of aid Warsaw, Prague, and
Budapest felt they needed. At the same time, the nations of East Central Europe began
to realize that in a world of increasing economic interdependence they could not afford
to alienate anyone, no matter how they felt about that nation.
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The situation in which both the East Central European nations and Russia find
themselves, illustrates an important reality in an ever more interdependent world --
national security, and the diplomacy aimed at maintaining that security, increasingly
involves economic security and prosperity. In the previous chapter it was asserted that
the East Central European states, as well as Russia, believe the greatest threat to their
security is political and economic instability both internally and in surrounding countries.
Therefore it is important to realize that in the future national security may increasingly
involve national attempts to prevent economic vulnerability due to foreign investment as
well as traditional economic preparation for military defense. 129
In addition, if economics and economic relations are becoming an increasingly
important aspect of foreign policy, one must consider the forms of economic statecraft
nations may employ. In one instance, weak states may use scarce natural resources to
influence the policies of strong and wealthy nations. A second form of economic
statecraft is the use of trade and financial assistance by strong states to influence the
policy options of weak states. Finally, the most dangerous form of economic statecraft
is the use of economic forces and means by strong states against each other; in other
words, economic warfare. 130
129Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security."
Political Science Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 272.
130Ibid., 272.
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Which form of economic statecraft will Russia employ? This chapter will examine
the fact that the Soviet Union, through Comecon, is largely responsible for the desperate
economic situation the East Central European states find themselves in today and for this
they have every right to turn their backs upon the Russians. At the same time, the forty
year ties to the Soviet economy still linger and cannot be easily severed. This fact is
particularly relevant when one considers that despite associate membership in the
European Community, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland will be restricted from
certain markets, such as textiles, steel, and agriculture, for five to ten years. The bottom
line, then, for East Central Europe is that in spite of whatever animosities they feel
toward Russia, their economic future is still heavily dependent on certain aspects of the
Russian market; a fact which the leadership of the East Central European nations
recognize. On the other hand, the strong economic ties between East Central Europe and
Russia provide a means through which Russia can still influence the actions of the East
Central European nations. In an era when Soviet troops are withdrawing from Eastern
Europe, the heavy reliance East Central European nations place upon Russian natural
resources give the Russians a potent foreign policy weapon.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the headlong rush toward
Western Europe was motivated by several factors, including the belief that Western
Europe had the financial capital to bring its eastern brothers into the late twentieth
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century.l31 In addition to this is the fact that the forty-odd years of Soviet domination
forged an artificial barrier between East Central Europe and the West. While
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are considered "east central" Europe, they are
culturally and historically Western. In this connection it is important to remember that
all of present day Hungary and Czechoslovakia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and that Poland was partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia between 1772 and
1795 and remained under these nations' control until 1918. In addition, even though
Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks are ethnically Slavic, like their Russian brothers, they are
more Western than Eastern. Indeed, the only link between the Russians, Poles, Czechs,
and Slovaks is their linguistic commonality.132 In every other aspect they are different.
Religiously, the Russians are Orthodox Christian, while the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks
are Roman Catholic. In terms of historical and political development, as we have already
mentioned, the nations of East Central Europe are tied to the West through the Austrians
and Germans. Given these historic ties, as well as the economic development of the
131Western Europe may only have themselves to blame for this. In early 11)91. a senior European
Community official stated, "Suddenly the West is confronted by its own past rhetoric when it complained,
'How evil the Communists are for not letting their people go.' Easterners would hear the community
boasting about its virtues so that's where they want to be -- either through membership or immigration."
Quoted in Alan Riding, "At the East-West Crossroads, Western Europe Hesitates." Thc Ncw York Times.
25 March 1991, A6.
132Indeed, pan-Slavism historicaJly is a movement which pro~laims an affinity for a variety of peoples
living in different political entities, with differing religious, culturaJ, and historical backgrounds solcly on
the basis of a common linguistic heritage. See Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and ldcolouy (Notrc
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1953), 1.
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West, it is not surprising that the primary aim of the East Central European nations is to
"return to Europe."m
Perhaps an even greater motivation for seeking to renew ties with Western Europe was
the imposition of an alien political and economic system upon the peoples of East Central
Europe. Nowhere is this more evident than in the creation of the WTO. Originally
created as a counter to NATO, the WTO came to symbolize the continuation of
illegitimate regimes which survived only because Red Army troops were stationed on
their territory.
Possibly the greatest tragedy of Soviet occupation, however, was the economic system
forced upon Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland which, while allowing some growth,
largely slowed their economic development in the post-World War II era. Although some
of the blame for slow growth lies with the nature of the planned economy itself, the main
reason for slow recovery in Eastern Europe as a whole lies with the fact that the Soviets
removed much of the industrial machinery from the occupied areas and took it to the
Soviet Union. 134
133The sentiment among the East Central European nations was probably best expressed in an August
1990 interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Jeszenszky when he stated that Hungary's main aim was
to rejoin Europe "to which it belonged to both in the cultural and economic field. until its bonds were
severed in 1945," While Poland and Czechoslovakia have not necessarily made similar statements. their
actions since 1989 indicate an equal desire to tum westward. See "Jeszenszky Comments on Foreign Policy
Issues" (text), Budaptist MTI in English. 1927 G~. 2 August 1990. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe
(FBIS-EEU-90-150.3 August 1990): 24.
134Marer• "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe." 156.
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One can understand the extent of the affect of Soviet domination on the economies of
East Central Europe by comparing the pre-war economic status of each country with the
conditions they find themselves in today. For example, prior to World War II
Czechoslovakia found itself the richest of the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Following the break up of the empire, it found itself with two-thirds of the
industry, but only one-fifth the area and one-quarter the population of the old empire.
Czechoslovakia's war industry alone was larger than that of Italy. During the 1930's,
while its neighbors were frantically trying to industrialize, Czechoslovakia produced half
the steel and pig iron in the region. 135 Before World War II, Czechoslovakia's per
capita gross national product (GNP) was at the same level as that ol Austria and Belgium,
its industries were on the cutting edge of technology, and its products were known
worldwide. 136 Even after World War II Czechoslovakia had a highly developed
industrial base that was not destroyed by the war. 137 Yet, after forty years of Soviet
influence, per capita GNP in Czechoslovakia has been reduced to only slightly better than
one-fifth that of Austria and Belgiuml38 and equivalent to that of Trinidad and Tobago. 13')
135Joseph Rothschild, East Centrol Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1974),86-87.
13liKarl Dyba and Jan Svejnar, "Czechoslovakia: Recent Economic Developments and Prospects."
American Economic Review 81 (May 1990): 185.
137Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," 157.
138Dyba and Svejnar, 185.
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Of the East Central European successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
Hungary fared the worst in the interwar period. As a major combatant in the Great War,
Hungary lost territory in the subsequent peace treaty. After the Ausgleich in 1867, which
split the Austrian Empire in half, Hungary ruled portions of what are now Austria,
Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. In fact, in 1910,
Hungarian territory covered over 282,000 square kilometers, but after the Treaty of
Trianon in 1920, it was reduced to just under 93,000 square kilometers. The economic
impact of such a loss in territory was tremendous. Fifty-eight percent of Hungary's
railroad mileage and 60 percent of its road mileage were lost. In natural resources
Hungary lost 84 percerit of its timber, 43 percent of its arable land, 83 percent of its iron
ore, 29 percent of its lignite, and 27 percent of its lituminous coal. However, Hungary
was fortunate in that 55.5 percent of the pre-war production value of its industry
remained. Nevertheless, Hungary's post-war industrialization lagged and by 1930, it was
still a heavily agrarian nation with over half its population engaged in agriculture. In all
fairness, Hungary's industrial development was hampered by the Great Depression. In
1929, the ratio of wage earners to dependents was 100:215, but by 1933 it had fallen to
100:303. By 1933, 25 percent of all industrial plants in Hungary were idle for more than
50 days.l40
139According to the World Bank. Czechoslovak per capita GNP in 1989 was 53.450. while in Trinidad
and Tobago it was $3.230. By comparison. Portugal's. a relatively poor West European nation. was $4.250.
See World Bank. World Development Report 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press. IYY 1).204-205.
14llRothschild. 156-170.
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Hungary was able to overcome its economic set back during the reannament
industrialization of the late 1930s. Its economic recovery was facilitated by alliance with
Nazi-Gennany which enabled Hungary to increase the percentage of its population
engaged in industry by 35.7 percent between 1938 and 1943. Hungary's economic
growth during the war was such that even though it lost 40 percent of its national wealth
and 24 percent of its industrial capacity during the war, the remaining industrial capacity
was still greater than what existed in 1938.141 But, as with Czechoslovakia, nearly fifty
years after the end of World War II Hungary finds itself with a per capita GNP only
slightly better than Brazi1's.142
The interwar economic development of Poland was somewhat different from that of
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Because of the partitions of Poland at the end of the
eighteenth century, what industry there was in Poland was largely geared toward the
Russian and Gennan economies; markets which after the Great War became hostile
foreign markets. Overall, pre-World War I Poland was largely an agrarian state.
Therefore, in the interwar period, Poland found itself faced with three problems:
reconstructing war related damage to industry; finding new markets; and a shOltage of
capital. 143 These problems were never" adequately addressed and what little industrial
141 Ibid.. 188-190.
142According to the International Bank:, Hungary's 1989 per capita GNP was $2.590. while Brazil's
was $2,540. Uruguay's was $2,620. See World Development Report 1991, 204-105.
143E. Garrison Walters. The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to /945 (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1988), 178.
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growth Poland experienced prior to World War II was unable to improve the country's
economic situation.144 Following World War II, Poland experienced rapid
industrialization so that by the 1980s it was the largest producer of electricity in Eastern
Europe outside the Soviet Union and equaled Czechoslovakia in steel production. 145
Nevertheless, despite such impressive economic growth, in 1989 Poland's per capita GNP
was the lowest among the three East Central European nations at only $1,790. 146
Given the level of industrialization among the East Central European nations at the
end of World War II, how could it happen that Western European nations like France,
Great Britain, and West Germany, whose industrial capacity was largely destroyed during
the course of the war, overcame their wartime destruction to become leaders of the
industrialized world, while Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland stagnated and even
declined? The answer can be found simply in the economic system implemented by the
Stalinist regimes in those countries at the behest of Soviet Russia. Put another way, the
economic systems implemented in Eastern and Western Europe largely reflected the
socio-political environment of the two regions. The capitalist system of the West
reflected the openness and individuality inherent in the democracies of Britain, France,
and West Gennany, while the structured order of the planned economy reflected the
l~othschild, 68-69.
145Alan H. Smith ed., East European Economic Handbook (London: EuromoniLor Publications. 1985).
171.
141>world Development Report 1991,204-205. Continuing our comparison of world GNPs. Poland's
was less than Mauritius ($1,990), but greater than Costa Rica ($1.780).
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control necessary in a totalitarian society. At the same time the economies of East
Central Europe demonstrated a complete disregard for the basic premises of economics.
By definition, economics is considered to be the effective, efficient use of resources to
produce a given product. In a free market society, the business which uses its resources
more effectively is rewarded through increased profits, while the finn which uses its
resources inefficiently either changes its procedures or is forced out of business. In the
command economies of Eastern Europe these principles were ignored. The firm which
used its resources wisely was rewarded at the same level as the firm which squandered
its resources. Therefore, the planned economies of East Central Europe slugged along
using the same technology which required increasing amounts of manpower and
resources, particularly energy resources, to produce its goods. In fact, to produce a unit
of national income the countries of Eastern Europe used about twice as much energy as
Western economies,t47 and their labor productivity was only about 40 percent of that
in the West. 148
1471n a 1990 interview. Hungarian Minister for Economic Relations Bela Kadar Slated. "[The Hungarian
economy] uses about 40 percent more energy than average in the developed countries in unit good
production. which is, in itself. an absurdity." See Zsolt Szalay. "Economic Relations Official on Oil Price
Effects" (excerpts). Budapest Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian. 0630 GMT. 12 August 1990. Trans.
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-90-156. 13 August 1990): 25.
148Yladimir Sobell. The CMEA in Crisis: Toward a New European Order'! (New York: Praeger. 1990).
5.
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The East European countries were aware of their technological backwa~dness and often
used spurts of import substitution industrialization149 to overcome their condition. Such
a strategy was attempted after World War II, but the pace and character of
industrialization was determined, not by economic bureaucrats in Czechoslovakia;
Hungary, and Poland, but by Soviet economic advisors with "shopping lists."151) In this
regard, the economic systems in East Central Europe were another means through which
the Soviet Union could dominate and control them. Not only were all Five Year Plans
coordinated through the Soviet embassies in each country, 151 but in effect the energy
and raw material intensive manufacturing in East Central Europe tied the Czechoslovak,
Hungarian, and Polish economies to a cheap source of raw materials and energy; the
Soviet Union.1S2
The principal vehicle through which the Soviets operated the Eastern European
economies was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). As
149IndustrialiZation through the domestic replacement of imported finished goods. See Gemld M.
Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1989).297-
3M. .
150Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe." 157. In the Stalinist
economic system the East European economies were geared toward Svviet needs. Therefore. Soviet
economic advisors determined production goals for Eastern Europe based on inputs necessary for the Soviet
economy. For example, Czechoslovak steel production would be determined by the amount of steel needed
for production of finished goods in the Soviet Union.
lSlIbid., 158.
lS2Indeed, the proliferation of heavy industry throughout Eastern Europe as a whole made them overly
dependent on the Soviet Union for raw materials and as a market. As a result. trade with the West was
underdeveloped. Vladimir Sobell. "East European Economies at a Turning Point." Report on Eastem
Europe, 4 May 1990, 41.
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mentioned earlier (see Chapter II), the CMEA was established in 1949 as an alternative
to the Marshall Plan submitted by the U.S. as a means of rebuilding war-tom Europe.
Not only did CMEA encourage the continuation of inefficient and energy intensive
industry within Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, but it also discouraged trade
between these countries, as well as other, non-member countries. CMEA discouraged
trade among its members through the use of the transferable ruble (TR) to pay for
goods. 153 The TR discouraged trade through the simple fact that it was neither
transferable nor a ruble. The TR was never a currency in the same manner as the Russian
ruble, but merely a bookkeeping unit for trade between CMEA members. 154 And
because it was not convertible the sizeable TR deficit the Soviets incurred with the East
Central European nations meant very little. 155
Despite the abysmal economic development and the inequalities inherent in CMEA
trade, the East Central European nations and the Soviet Union were economically tied
together. A glance at the level of trade between the CMEA partners illustrates the
importance of Soviet trade. Figure 1 shows that while Soviet imports have declined since
1986, they still represent a significant share of total East Central European imports.
153Patrice Dabrowski, "East European Trade (Part I): The Loss of the Soviet Market." Report on
Eastern Europe, 4 October 1991, 30.
154Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," 16H.
155For example, between 1987 and 1991 the Soviets incurred a debt with Hungary of TR 2.457 billion.
Through negotiations the Soviets agreed to convert this sum into dollars at a rate of lJ2 cents per TR.
Therefore, the Soviets owe Hungary just over $2.260 billion. "Talks With USSR To Settle Trade Debt"
(text), Budapest MTI in English, 1552 GMT, 6 November 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-
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Figure 2156 illustrates the same point with regard to East Central European exports to
the Soviet Union. 157 Of course, because CMEA represented Soviet domination of the
region, ·as well as the stifling of economic growth, it is no wonder Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland would want to turn to other means of improving their economic
positions.
C. THE WEST, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND EAST CENTRAL
EUROPE
In January 1991, the countries of the CMEA met to discuss the inevitable: the final
disposition of their organization. The end of CMEA was probably a foregone conclusion
once the communist regimes in Eastern Europe began to fall. Even in late 1989 trade
between East Central Europe and the Soviet Union began to decline. While this may not
seem very significant, the economic impact of declining trade with the Soviet Union has
been considerable, particularly when one considers that Soviet, as well as inter-CMEA
trade, consumed the bulk of East Central European commerce. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate
the rapid decline in trade between the Soviet Union and East Central Europe. In addition,
156pigures for Poland for 1989 unavailable.
157However, it should be noted that this is changing. The effects of the decline in Soviet trade arc
slowly being offset by trade with the West, particularly Gennany. For example. while the CIS remained
the largest importer of Czechoslovak goods (32.3 percent) in 1991. it was the second overall exporter ( 19.4
percent) to Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile. Gennan exports to Czechoslovakia increased by 25 percent and
Gennan imports increased by 20.1 percent. During the same year. Hungarian t:xports to Germany increased
by 33 percent. See Vlado Gajdosik. "Prospects for Foreign Trade Outlined" (tt:xt). Bratislava Var:;llos( in
Slovak, 1 February 1992. Trons. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-024. 5
February 1992): 12-13; also "Bilateral Trade With Gennany Detailed" (excerpts). Dusseldorf I/wuJelsh{(/((
in German, 7 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. E,L'itern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-02X.
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because of the heavy influence of CMEA trade on the economies of the East Central
European nations, once trade began to decline the economic house of cards began to fall.
For example, Poland's $300 million trade deficit in the first quarter of 1991 was largely
due to the decline in Soviet trade. 158 In fact, according to the Economic Commission
for Europe, the economic situation in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990 was comparable to
the situation in Western Europe at the end of World War II. At the time the Commission
suggested a new Marshall Plan to save the struggling economies in the region, but the
Commission said the new plan would differ in that large amounts of technical aid would
be needed to help in the transition from planned economies to a free market. However,
while the Commission stated that it did not necessarily mean to imply technical aid over
financial aid, this seems to be what is taking place. 159
This may not necessarily be a bad thing, nor is it necessarily what the nations of East
Central Europe want. In the first place, there is no doubt that some type of technical aid
or advisors will be needed to repair their economic infrastructure and even to train people
to become effective managers in a free market system. Therefore, in a sense, the nations
of East Central Europe find themselves faced with the same problems as the Polish
leadership following World War I: repairing notnecessarily war damaged industry, but
upgrading industrial technology; finding new markets; and a shonage of capital.
158Stephen Engelberg, "Eastern Europe's Hardships Grow :L') Trade with Soviets Dries Up." The New
York Times, 6 May 1991, AI.
159Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe ill 1l.Jl.J()-Il.Jl.J I
(New York: United Nations. 1991).5.
87
Obviously the road to achieving these goals lies to the West, since logically if you want
to be successful one seeks advice from others who are successful. But stating one's goals
is one thing and realizing them is quite another. While Western Europe may be willing
to invest in East Central Europe, investment is selective and more importantly not really
what the governments of East Central Europe believe will get them out of their economic
bind. To Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland the key to economic recovery is
membership in the European Community (EC) and establishing markets for their goods
in Western Europe. l60
This does not mean that the East Central European nations do not want Western
investment, for certainly they realize that foreign capital is needed particularly to repair
and build new industrial infrastructure. On the other hand, perhaps they realize that in
a free market environment the investor must feel that he will get a good return on his
investment, something which Western investors may not believe is possible right now.
In fact, the very conditions in the region which must be overcome to allow economic
growth may form obstacles to foreign investment. First, for the near tenn the East
Central European economies may be driven by public expenditures and not market forces.
The legacy of pollution carried over from the communist period must be dealt with
effectively before further industrial growth can be attempted. Second, while hourly wages
loUIn a JUly 1991, interview Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier stated. "ITlhc most import:Ull
assistance [from the West) would be to have doors in the West opened to our exports." Ana AnlOlin.
"Dienstbier on European Security, USSR Treaty" (excerpt), Madrid ABC in Spanish. 2X Jlily IlYlY I. Trans.
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-151. 6 August IlJlJl): II.
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in East Central Europe are relatively low when compared to those in Western Europe,
giving East Central Europe a comparative advantage in manufacturing, newly opened
borders to the West have lead to the fear of a "brain-drain" as the best and brightest
Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles venture West in search of better paying jobs and
a better life. However, perhaps the greatest obstacle to Western investment lies with the
soaring East Central European foreign debt. 161 In 1989, the, combined East Central
European foreign debt was $71.8 billion ($7.9 billion for Czechoslovakia, $20.6 billion
for Hungary, and $43.3 billion for Poland). In 1992, Hungary's debt is projected to reach
$21.512 billion and Poland's $33.078 billion162 (these figures do not include
International Monetary Fund loans).163
There are also domestic barriers to foreign investment and implied privatization. One
reservation results from the fact that East Central Europe's obsolescent factories were
over staffed in order to hide unemployment. Privatization could mean that one-third of
all employees would be out of a job. Perhaps the greatest domestic concern lies with the
fact that joint ventures between domestic and foreign businesses could result in as much
161Derek Leebaert, "A (Fool's'?) Gold Rush in Eastern Europe," Orbis 34 (Fall II)I)()): 551-553.
162.rhe good news for Poland is that Germany has agreed to forgive part of Poland's debt to Gennany.
On 19 February 1992, the German Finance Ministry announced it would forgive $5.5 hillion (about 50
percent) of Poland's debt to the German government. The remaining 50 percent is to he repaid over IX
years at market interest rates. However, the $11..5 billion Poland still owes German collllllcrcial hanks was
not affected by the agreement. Roman Stefanowski. "Germany Forgives Half of Poland's Govcrnlllcnt
Debt." RFE(RL Daily Report, 20 February 1992.
163W Id D . .or ebt Tables 1990-1991 (Washmgton, D.C.: The World Bank. 11)1.)().
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as one-third of East Central European industrial assets being foreign owned. 1M In
Czechoslovakia, there are complaints that too much Western investment may "become a
political and economic problem." [(i5 At the same time, Czechoslovak Finance Minister
Vaclav Kraus, in January 1992, indicated his annoyance at Western investors who
complained the federal government was not doing enough to support foreign investment.·
Kraus stated there was no reason to give foreign enterprises specific help not available
to domestic producers.l66 These two instances are indicative of an increasing anti-
foreigner sentiment throughout the region stemming from the fear that too much of their
domestic industry is becoming controlled by foreign interests.
However, one should not get the impression that no foreign capital is flowing into East
Central Europe. Quite the contrary. But the fact is that in the brutal realities of market
economics the ultimate question any potential investor must answer is, "What's in it for
me?" Indeed, investors are deciding that the rewards are worth the risk. In December
1990, the Czech Republic government announced that Volkswagen had won out over
Renault-Volvo in buying into Skoda, the state owned car company. In the largest cross-
border investment in European history, Volkswagen agreed to invest DM9.5 billion ($6.3
billion) over seven years with an initial investment of DM500 million ($333 million).
l~eebaert, 554-555.
165Berthold Koller, "Kraus Criticizes Western Investors' Support Call" (exccrpt), Frankfurt-am-Main
Frankfurter Allgemeine in German, 16 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Rcport. Eastcrn Europe
(FBIS-EEU-92-011, 16 January 1992): 19.
166Ibid., 18.
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Initially, Volkswagen would own a 31 percent share of the Czechoslovak car company,
but by 1995 this would grow to 70-75 percent. Volkswagen's motivation for the deal was
its desire to find a way of penetrating the East European car market. For the Czechs, the
huge amount of the deal may encourage further investment in their economy. I!>?
Elsewhere in East Central Europe, investment is also increasing. In Hungary less
bureaucratic stonewalling as well as tax exemptions for foreign investors has led to
increased investment. l68 In fact, in 1990, the EC pledged $15 billion to Poland and
Hungary through 1992 and the Group of 24 nations promised $3.8 billion to
Czechoslovakia.169 Yet despite these pledges, other investment is not as great as it
could be. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Western bank loans to Eastern Europe declined by $6.4 billion in the first quarter of 1990
and had dried up by December 1990.170 The Economic Commission for Europe stated
that between October 1989, and January 1991, the number of investors in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union jumped from 2,900 to 16,700, but the amounts of foreign capital
167Jan Obrman, "Skoda Becomes Part of the Volkswagen Empire." Report on Eastem Europe, 25
January 1991, 7-11.
168"Less Talk, More Action Please," The Economist. 16 February 1991, 54.
169Marvin Jackson. "The International Economic Situation and Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern
Europe, 28 December 1990. 39.
170Ibid., 39.
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involved were small. In October 1989, foreign investment averaged $1 million, but in
January 1991, the average was only $500,000. 171
Capital investment is only one side of the development issue, albeit an impOitant one.
The East Central European nations seem to be caught in a Catch-22 where they need
financial capital to improve their economies, but. foreign investors are unwilling to invest
significant amounts of capital until the economies improve. Perhaps for this reason the
governments believe that the real road to economic. recovery is through the EC and
cultivating new markets in the West. But here, again, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland find the road a rough one. Not only does EC membership seem almost within
their grasp, but still far away, but EC restrictions place barriers on their entry into
Western markets.
In late 1989, the EC seemed to want Eastern Europe as part of their organization, but
only on the periphery. At the time, EC Commission President Jacques Oelors was afraid
the events in Eastern Europe would upset progress toward greater union among the West
European nations. His view of Europe and the EC envisaged a series of concentric circles
with the center circle consisting of those EC members committed to closer integration;
the second circle consisting of those members not committed to closer integration (e.g.,
Great Britain); the third circle encompassing the nations of the European Free Trade
Association; and the fourth, outer, circle encompassing Eastern Europe. While Oelors
was articulating his view on the EC a!1d the future of Europe, however, he was opposed
171Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe. 6.
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to closer integration for Eastern Europe for fear of upsetting the Soviets, particularly since
there were those in Western Europe who viewed the EC as the core of a future defensive
arrangement. 172
By the end of 1990 EC members had already concluded trade agreements with several
CMEA members. But at the same time, events in Eastern Europe were causing problems
for the EC. The poorer EC members were afraid Northern European members, such as
France and Germany, would send aid to Eastern Europe instead of them. Elsewhere, the
French farmers union was afraid it would be hurt by increased agricultural imports from
Hungary and Poland.173 In order to help bring Eastern Europe into the EC orbit, Oelors
proposed the EC speed up integration to strengthen the EC as a pan-European
organization, while at the same time intensifying its ties to Eastern Europe. Oelors also
stated that it was the EC's duty to get the Eastern European economies on the road to full
EC membership, a duty which would cost 14 billion ECU (European Currency Units)
($17 billion) a year. 174
172"Westward Ho," The Economist, 25 November 1989.58.
173French fanners may face serious competition in agriculture. particularly from Poland. In agricultural
output, Poland is second in Europe only to France. Its sugarbeet production is third after France and
Germany. In potato production Poland produces nearly as much as all of the EC combined. Roger Boyes.
"Snails Trailing in Polish Race for Western Markets," Times (London), 17 Decemher IlJlJl. II.
174Yladimir Sobell, "Eastern Europe and the European Community." Report Oil Eastern Europe. 23
February 1990,45-47.
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Despite Delors' generous offer, there are those who feel the EC may, in fact, be an
obstacle to East Central European economic recovery. i75 One observer described
Delors' plan as "with one hand throwing the financial rope to Eastern Europe, but with
the other pulling up [the community's] institutional ladder. ,,176 In other words, while
the EC seems perfectly willing to throw money at the East Central European economic
problems, they are unwilling to open certain markets to East Central European goods.
This is particularly true with regard to textiles, steel, and agricultural products. These are
the areas where Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland believe they are competitive, but
are kept out because of EC trade restrictions. 177
In December 1991, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland received associate
membership in the EC and it seems realistic they could be full members before the turn
of the century.178 But there are those in East Central Europe who believe the EC
i75Leebaert.562.
176Sobell• "Eastern Europe and the European Community." 47.
in'Open Up." The Economist. 3 August 1991. 17. See also Josef C. BrmJ.1. "The European
Community and Czechoslovakia. Hungary. and Poland." Report on Eastern Europe. 6 December 1':>':>1.28.
i7~he "Associate Agreements" between the East Central European nations and the EC largely represent
a political victory for Czechoslovakia. Hungary. and Poland in that they formally acknowledged each
nation's intent to enter the EC. Each agreement is valid for ten years during which time Czechoslovakia.
Hungary. and Poland are to take steps to restructure their economies in preparaLion for becoming EC
members. These are incorporated in a series of principles to which all EC members agree Lo adhere. These
principles include: budget deficits not exceeding 3 percent by the end of the decade; and intlmion raLes no
higher than 1.5 percent above the average rate in the three member nations with Lhe lowest inflation raLe.
Since its inception in 1957. the EC has concluded a number of "associate" agreements with various
countries. These were signed for various reasons such as promoting economic development. in the case of
Third World countries. or expanding European trade. as with the European Free Trade Association.
Associate membership is not necessarily a requirement for membership (the United Kingdom. Denmark.
and Ireland joined in 1973 without such an agreement). although Greece joined the EC alier an associate
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agreement is one sided. They see EC as asking Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to
open their markets, while EC markets remain closed to East Central European goodS. 179
There is some truth to this. While the EC will open some markets to Czechoslovak,
Hungarian, and Polish goods, agricultural markets will remain restricted for ten years.
Likewise, tariffs on steel will remain in place for five years and those on textiles for
six. ISO So, while associate membership is a victory for the East Central European states,
it is only a partial victory. They must compete in the West at a disadvantage, while at
the same time struggling to improve their production capability.
D. RUSSIA AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
Of course, as Soviet troops are withdrawn from East Central Europe, Russia will be
unable to militarily influence policy in the region, but based on the economic ties
instituted by the Soviet Union, Russia will have a substantial foreign policy lever for the
near term. There are three sides of this issue which will allow Russia to apply economic
pressure to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland: Russian markets, Russian debts, and
Russian resources, especially oil and natural gas. In this connection, the fact that the
Soviets were not nearly as dependent upon mutual trade as their counterparts in East
agreement lasting twenty years. See Jan de WeydenthaJ. "Czechoslovakia. Hungary. and Poland Gain
Associate Membership in the EC." RFEfRL Research Report. 7 February 1l)l)2. 24-26.
179Brada• "The European Community and Czechoslovakia. Hungary. and Poland." 31.
lao"EC Spokesman Comments" (text). Budapest MTI in English. LOl3 GMT. \6 December \l)l)1. FBIS
Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-242. 17 December 1991): 1.
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Central Europe is significant. As Figures 5 and 6181 illustrate, at the most, Soviet
exports to the East Central European nations accounted for just over 10 percent of total
imports, while exports never exceeded 10 percent.
Aside from total imports, there is the issue of East Central European dependence on
Soviet (now Russian) oil and natural gas. Indeed, the Economic Commission for Europe
stated the biggest constraint to East European growth was a lack of fuel. 182 As we have
already noted, the Stalinist economic system employed by the East Central European
nations required inordinate amounts of energy; energy which the Soviet Union was willing
to provide at pric~s substantially below world market prices (for example, the Soviet
Union charged as little as $7 per barrel for oil). As a result of these arrangements,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, relied upon the Soviet Union to provide as much
as 95 percent of their crude oil and nearly 100 percent of their natural gas supplies.
East Central European reliance on foreign energy resources is only one side of the
much larger issue of continued trade with Russia -- the forty year trade ties through
CMEA will not disappear overnight. Even though trade with the former Soviet Union is
falling off dramatically, replacement markets are not being found at an equal or greater
rate and with EC restrictions on certain goods, the East Central European nations will
have to look elsewhere for markets for those goods. Russia represents a potentially large
untapped market for those goods shut out of EC markets. Although Russia will be able
181Figures for Poland lor 19X9 unavailable.
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to purchase better and cheaper consumer goods from the West, it will still be able to look
to East Central Europe for other items, especially agricultural product'). Trade in this area
will certainly work to their mutual advantage: Russia needs food, and East Central Europe
wants to trade its agricultural products.183 By the same token, the East Central
European nations still require large amounts of Russian crude oil and natural gas. l84
While the large Russian market offers opportunities for East Central European
development, this is offset by serious trade issues. The two most serious issues currently
are Russia's foreign debt and its declining oil production. Not only has Russia run up a
sizeable foreign debt of its own with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but it has
assumed the lion's share of the former Soviet debt as well. 185 We have already noted
that the Soviet government owed Hungary about $2.260 billion. In addition, the Soviets
owed R4.6 billion to Czechoslovakia, which by agreement was converted on a one for'one
I83Hungary, for example. harvested 15 million metric tonnes of grain in 1991 and had hoped associate
membership in the EC would open better markets in Western Europe. However. since EC agricultural
markets are to remain restricted. Hungary wiU certainly want to look elsewhere for grain markets.
"Secretary Reports 1991 Harvest 'Highly Favorable'" (text). Budapest MTI in English. 1424 GMT. 21)
November 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-23 I. 2 Decemher Il)lJ I): 16.
184ln this regard, Vitally Zhurkin. Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences European Institute, stated
in a 26 July 1991 interview: "The USSR has been and remains a market for many products of the East
European Countries because -- to put it quite frankly -- while these products sell sluggishly in the Western
market, they often sell far better than Soviet products. In addition. we have created a powerful
infrastructure -- oil pipelines, gas pipelines. railroad freight lines. a fixed interconnection of electricity
networks, etc." Aleksey Borzenko, "Official Interviewed on Relations with Europe" (text). Moscow
Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian, 26 July 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS·
SOV-91-155, 12 August 1991): 15.
185See page 3 above for a discussion of the responsibility of the former Soviet dehl shared hy Bcl:u·us·.
Russia, and Ukraine.
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basis into $4.6 billion, and R7.2 billion to Poland (conversion amount not indicated).18b
Although Russia, Belarus', and Ukraine have agreed to assume nearly 80 percent of the
former Soviet debt, the issue for the East Central European nations is not so much who
will pay, but when they will be paid. This concern is complicated by the fact that
repayment of the Soviet debt must be negotiated individually with each of the successor
states. While the Hungarians would like to have their foreign debt settled as soon as
possible, the Soviets stated that debt repayment would be spread over a five year
period.187 However, Russia has agreed to repay $300-350 million of the amount in
1992.188 By the same token, Czechoslovakia does not expect repayment of its debt
before 1995.189
Nor are Russia's debt woes limited to East Central 'Europe. At home the Russian
Finance Ministry announced a government deficit of R84 billion in the first quarter of
1992, as compared to an annual government deficit of R70 billion in 1991.1~() At the
186"Soviet Business Report Dated 'September 26,1991'" (text). Moscow Intertax in English. 2030
GMT, 25 September 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOY-lJl-187, 26 September 1991): 12.
187"Talks With USSR To Settle Trade Debt." 12.
188"Economic Ties to Commonwealth Republics 'Healthy'" (text), Budapest MTI in English. 1640
GMT, 16 December 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-242. 17 December 1991):
22.
189Marcela Doleckova, "Ministry Official Discusses Soviet Trade Issues" (excerpts), Prague
Hospodarske Noviny in Czech, 25 November 1991. Trans, by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe.
(FBIS-EEU-91-234,5 December 1991): 8.
190Irina Demchenko, "First Quarter Deficit of R84 Billion Projected" (text), Moscow I:vesliva in
Russian, 24 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOY -92-057, 24
March 1992): 49.
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same time, Yurii Gromushkin, advisor to the Russian Minister of Foreign Economic
Relations, stated that Russia was unable to service all of its foreign debt because it had
shouldered 90 percent of the former Soviet debt. In order to make payments, he said,
Russia has had to freeze individual and company hard currency accounts.I'J1 In
addition, in February, First Deputy Foreign Minister Petr Aven said that other members
of the CIS were not paying their share of the former Soviet debt. Aven stated that Russia
owes $8.7 billion this year and might seek partial referral of interest payments following
the postponement of $11.1 billion in principal payments agreed to by Western
creditors.192 The magnitude of the Russian debt and the difficulties in paying even the
interest on its debt poses serious trade problems for Russia not only in East Central
Europe, but throughout the world.
However, measures are being taken to ensure payment of the rising Russian debt. On
16 January 1992, Russia and Czechoslovakia signed a $1.7 billion trade accord in which
$163 million would be earmarked to pay the Russian debt to Czechoslovakia.I'J3 In
February, the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank Shareholding Company opened a bank
191Keith Bush, "External Debt Repayment." RFE(RL Daily Report. 13 March 11)1)2.
192Keith Bush, "CIS Meeting on Debt Service:' RFE(RL Daily Report. 24 February 11)1)2. In January
1992. the Paris Club agreed to postpone servicing of the principle on medium and long term credit received
prior to I January 1991. Under the agreement. the republics of the lormer Soviet Union would only have
to pay $9 billion of the overdue debt of $20 billion in 1992. "Economic Official on Paris Talks. Debt"
(text), Moscow RIA in English, 1913 GMT, 9 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-
SOV-92-011-A, 16 January (992): 9.
193"Joint CSFR Oil Export Protocol Signed" (text), Prague CSTK in English. OX25 GMT. l7 January
1992. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-015. 23 January 11)1.)2): lX.
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account for the Russian Federation Foreign Trade Bank. Thirty-eight percent of the value
of all Russian exports to Czechoslovakia will be placed in this accollnt. These funds are
intended exclusively to pay for Russian purchases in Czechoslovakia and to repay the
former Soviet debt to Czechoslovakia.l94
Not only are the East Central European nations having difficulty collecting previous
debts from the Soviet successor states, but they are also having problems receiving
payment for current transactions which in turn is interfering with trade. The East Central
European nations want to trade with Russia, but Russia is unable to pay for the goods it
imports. For example, by the end of March 1991, Poland had paid $300 million for
Soviet imports, but had received only $20 million for its exports to the Soviet Union. 1'J5
Likewise, in August 1991, Hungarian officials indicated that while the Soviets had
ordered $400 million worth of pharmaceuticals, by August Hungary had received only $6
million in payment. 196 These difficulties have led, at least in Czechoslovakia, to the
promise to withhold payment for Russian oil and raw materials to ensure payment of
goods exported to Russia. In January 1992, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister
194"New Payment Method Defined for Trade with Russia" (text). Prague lIos{Joclarske No viII v in
Czech, 27 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ2-04 L 2
March 1992): 14.
195'''Disastrously Low' Exports to USSR Reported" (text). Warsaw PAP in English. 152X GMT. II
April 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-071. 12 April llJlJl): 20.
196"Minister Views Economic Ties with USSR" (text), Budapest MTI in English. 1306 GMT. 26
August 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ 1-166. 27 August llJlJ I): 2 I.
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Lubomir Martak: stated that Czechoslovak companies would only begin exporting goods
to Russia when "money has been paid into our bank accounts."l'.17
For the Russians, the balance of payment difficulties stem from a lack of hard
currency. In the first seven months of 1991, Eastern Europe paid for its raw material and
energy imports from the Soviet Union in hard currency, while the Soviets were unable
to reciprocate.193 Part of the problem stems from the fact that 80 percent of Soviet hard
currency earnings came from energy exports.199 Therefore, sagging oil production and
the resulting decline in crude oil exports combine to decrease the amount of hard currency
coming into Russian accounts.
The subtle irony of the cash flow problem between the former Soviet Union and East
Central Europe is that it 'resulted from the adoption of hard currency payment by CMEA
on 1 January 1991; a proposal put forward by the Soviets.21111 As a result, economic
transactions between Russia and East Central Europe have returned to barter trade.
Despite the fact that it was outlawed by the Soviet government in ll)l) I, barter trade has
grown. Generally these agreements include East Central European agricultural products
in return for Soviet energy, although they have included other items. In late ll)l)(), Poland
197Barbara Kroulik, "Czechoslovak Trade With Russia." RFEtRL Daily Report. 2X January 1l)l)2.
198Patrice Dabrowski, "European Trade (Part II): Creative Solutions by the Former Eastern Bloc."
Report on Eastern Europe, 11 October 1991,29.
199John M. Kramer, "Eastern Europe and the 'Energy Shock' of 1990-91." X6.
21111patrice Dabrowski, "East European Tmde (Part 1II): Gelling the West Involved." Report Oil Eastern
Europe, 18 October 1991, 30.
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agreed to trade food and tobacco valued at $120 million in return for natural gas. In
addition, the Soviets agreed to provide 200,000 barrels of oil per day in 1991. At the
same time, Czechoslovakia, in an agreement apparently directly with the Tyumen oil
region, agreed to barter heavy equipment in return for 500,000 metric tonnes (MT)201
of oil.202 However, these agreements seem rather small when compared to the
agreement signed by Deputy Foreign Trade Ministers Andrzej Olechowski of Poland and
Vladimir Rabotiyazov of Russia on 24 December 1991. In that agreement Russia agreed
to provide five million MT of oil and eight billion cubic meters of natural gas in
exchange for $400 million. worth of coal, pharmaceuticals, sulphur, and coking coal, in
addition to $500 million in food.203
However, there is a danger if Russia places all its faith in oil for saving its foreign .
trade. Since 1988, Soviet oil production, and related oil exports, have been falling
dramatically, as Figures 7 and 8 indicate. Although decreases in production were not that
great initially, as early as 1990, experts in the U.S. were predicting a drop in Soviet oil
production. At the time they blamed the impending decline on depleted oil fields, a
shortage of funds for off-shore and Arctic Circle exploration, as well as waterlogged oil
fields which resulted from Soviet attempts to increase production by injecting water into
:!OlOne metric lonne of oil is equivalent 10 7.3 barrels of 42 gallons each. "Soviet Exports of Oil
Plunge." The New York Times, 10 February IlJlJ2. C4.
202"Food for Oil and Gas," The Wall Street Journal. 15 October IlJlJO. A13.
203"Deputy Minister Signs Russian Trade Agreement" (text). Warsaw PAP in English. 1648 GMT. 24





(Millions of Metric Tonnes]
Tonnage700,.--------------------,
:~~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~----_._-_.._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~
100 ----•••--- •• ------.--•••--•••••---.----.--- •••••---- •.---- ... ---
300 -----.-•• --- •. ---- •••---•••----••. -•••. -----.---------.-.----- ..
200 r---.-..-----..----..----.-----..-----.------.----..----.--.---.-
100 r-- •••_------------.--- ••----.-••-.-- •• ----- .•----.----.- •.. -----
O'---~-...L.--......- .....--J..---'--.......---'--'--~
1982 1983 1984 1985 19B6 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Yellr
-USSR
SOUl;.' U.N. En.rvy 51111111;1 Yearbook
.11982-1989); Inllllax, 2200 GMT, 9 Ocl
91;ln FBIS·SOV, tI Ocl 91, 22 (1990·921
USSR OIL EXPORTS
(Millions of metric lonnes)
Tonnag&
150...----:;.....--------------------,
140 •• ------ .. --- ... --- ..
120
100 .----... -.---- .. -.----.-.-•.. --- -•... ---- .... ---.--- -.-----
90 ---•• -•. ---- .. ---.----.-----.- -.---- .. ------- .. ------ ----
50 ------.- •.•--- ... -- .•.. ---.-.-- .. - ---- .. --- ..... -- ... ------
40 .----------.--- .. -.----.-----.------.-.-.- .. -.-- .. -.------------
20 --••_-.----- •. ---_.---- •• ---- ••. ---- •. --.---- ..•. -.--.-.-----.--
O'--_....L-_.......__.l.-._....._ .......__~_ _I__ ___J._ ____l
1992 1993 1984 1995 1996 1997 1999 1999 1990 199\
Year
-USSR
SOUlce' U.N. Enerv, Slalllliu Yealbook
11982·1989); New York Times, 10 FebrUlry
1992, Al (1990-1991)
104
oil wells.204 In the past year Soviet revelations have supported this conclusion. In
January 1992, experts said that 41 percent of the oil reserves of the former Sov iet Union
had been exhausted. The report went on to say that the remainder would be sufficient for
thirty to fifty years. However, if no new wells are sunk, no oil will be produced in five
years time, particularly at the current rate of extraction which is three to five times greater
that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.20s In fact, in October 1991, Ilya Leschints,
an executive with the USSR Oil and Gas Ministry, statec that the fall in oil production
resulted from the fact that fewer wells were being drilled. According to Leschints, it
would take 11,000 new wells to keep production at a stable level, but only 7,500 new
wells are being commissioned.206 In a separate report, it has been speculated that oil
production throughout the former Soviet Union could fall to 400 million MT in 1992.207
204peter Martin. "The Oil Crisis and Prospects for Foreign Trade:' Report on Eastern Europe, 31
August 1990. 8.
20S"Forty_One Percent of Oil Reserves Said 'Exhausted'" (text), Moscow Teleradiokof!1{JUflivu
Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian. 1500 GMT. 31 January 1l)l)2. Trans. by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report. Centrol Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-025. 6 February 1992): 48. In contrast to this report
is one in June 1991, which stated 80 percent of Soviet oil deposits had been exhausted. "Technical
Problems in Oil Production Viewed" (text). Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English. 2300 GMT.
2 June 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-107. 4 June Il)l) 1): 21.
206"Business Report Views Crisis in Oil Industry" (text). Moscow Ifller(lLt in English. 2200 GMT. l)
October 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOY-l) 1-1l)8. II October IlJlJ I): 22.
207There is also speculation in Russia that even the 400 million MT figure may not be mel. While
reports say Russian output will reach 350-360 million MT in 1992. President of the Russian state oil
corporation. Rosnejiegaz. Lev Churilov. said in March that the 400 million MT target may not be met if
oil production continued to decline at a rate of 20.000 MT a day. He blamed the uecline in production on
the lack of central control and the abnormally low price of oil. R350 per tonne (about S3.S0). Churilov said'
he believed the price of oil should be raised to R2.200 to R2.500 per tonne ($22.0ll to S25.ll0). See Keith
Bush. "Forecast of Oil output and Exports." RFE(RL Daily Report. 20 February ll)lJ2: and "Oil Shortfall
Blamed on Central Control" (text), Moscow Interfax in English. 1621 GMT. l) Mm'dl IlJlJ2. FBIS Dailv
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The same report stated that if all the oil wells that were out of commission in Russia were
restarted, output would rise by about 24 million MT per year.208
Of course, any reduction in oil revenues impacts Russia the most. In 19S9, Russia
produced nearly 91 percent of all Soviet oil209 and just over 91 percent of the 1991
total.210 Over one-half of this total comes from the Tyumen oil region which produces
6.1 million barrels of oil per day, more than any nation except Saudi Arabia and the U.S.
Although output is still high, compared to other oil producing nations, without modem
equipment oil output will not increase. At the same time, Russian oil producers cannot
raise the necessary funds to modernize their operations. Under current rules, Russian oil
companies are required to sell most of their oil to the state at artificially low prices; the
equivalent of 80 cents per barrel.211 At the same time, 40 percent of their foreign
currency earnings are required to be exchanged with the government at the rate of .61
ruble to the dollar.212
Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-048, 11 March 1992): 34.
208Deborah Hargreaves, "Soviet Oil Production to Fall by 13 Percent," Financial Times (London), 29
January 1992, 28.
209Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 (Moscow: 1990), 33R.
21OLouis Uchitelle, "A Failed Cliche in Siberia: Rich in Oil. but not 'Oil Rich'." The New York Times.
11 February 1992, A1.
2llIbid., A6.
212"Soviet Oil Exports Decline: Republics Blame Two Laws," The Wall Street Journal. :; August 1991,
All.
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There is no doubt Russia could modernize its oil industry if its oil could be sold at
world market prices, but getting the initial investment is the difficulty. American oil
companies are hesitant to invest large sums in Russian oil production because of the
substantial export tax and because they fear that modem Western technology will not be
needed by the late 1990s.213 In addition, it seems that Western technology may not be
as badly needed as at fITSt thought. In one joint operation, American equipment was used
at fIrst until Russian equipment was found to be cheaper and good enough for the task,
especially when Wes~ern drilling techniques were used.214
Given this discovery it appears that Russia's oil worries can be solved by raising oil
prices and cutting the export tax. But can the Russians do that? While the artificial oil
price makes oil production unprofitable, it does give the Russian people a cheap source
of fuel. If oil prices are raised, how will the Russians feel about higher heating oil prices
in addition to other soaring costs? Indeed, the Russian leadership plans to continue the
deregulation of the price structure begun on 1 January 1992. However, their efforts have
been resisted by continuing inflation caused by loosening of price controls. In March,
Yeltsin told the leaders of political parties and democratic movements that deregulation
213American oil companies are afraid the Russians will use Western technology to increase production
in order to generate more revenues from sales. The increased profits would then be used to develop Russian
technology, or copy and produce Western technology, so that by the late 1990s Western companies would
no longer be needed.
21'\.ouis Uchitelle, "American Oilmen Wary on Russia," The New York Times, II Fehruary 1992, C2.
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of fuel prices, originally set for 20 April would be delayed until Mayor June.215
Nevertheless, Yeltsin continues to receive criticism from opponents who say he is moving
too fast. The chainnan of the Russia Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, said in March that
further price liberalization would destroy Russian industry and hann the population.216
However, First Deputy Prime Minister Egor GaidaI' defended deregulation of energy
prices, saying:
The current structure of prices, based on cheap energy, cannot continue. A little
longer and the whole sector will grind to a halt and will bring the whole economy
down with it.217
Despite criticism, however, on 18 May Yeltsin signed a resolution raising the price of oil
from 48 cents per barrel to between $2.47 and $3.01 per barrel. While this represents an
increase of over 500 percent, it is still well below the current market price of $20 per
barrel. For the consumer this means an increase in the price of gasoline to 30 cents per
gallon, as compared to only two cents per gallon four months previous.2lll
The East Central European nations have already come face-to-face with this prospect.
Not only did the price of Soviet crude rise to the world market price on I January 1991,
but the overall decline in Soviet oil exports raised fears of a complete shut off of oil
21SKeith Bush, "Deregulation of Russian Energy Prices." RFEtRL Daily Report. 25 March 1992.
216Keith Bush. "Dispute Over Energy Prices." RFEiRL Daily Report. 26 March 1992.
217Ibid.
218Celestine Bohlen. "Yeltsin Removes Limits on Prices for Oil and Gas." The New York Times. 11)
May 1992. C9.
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supplies from the Soviet Union. In April 1992, Poland's Andrzej Olchowski, now finance
minister, expressed his country's fears when he said that Poland was dependent on
Russian energy and was horrified by the "prospect of an economic conflict between
Russia and Ukraine that could stop supplies. ,,219
In addition, while natural gas production has been increasing, Russia has been
threatening to decrease exports of natural gas to East Central Europe. Poland is
particularly affected where industry is suffering from deliveries which in January 1992,
were 55 percent below norma1.220 Poland states that neither political nor economic
stability on their part is to blame; the shortages are clearly the fault of the Russian
219Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Poland Wants Share of CIS Trade," RFE(RL Daily Report, 3 April 11.)92.
220Sergey Mushkaterov. "Talks With Poland on 1992 Deal Reviewed" (text). M9SCOW I:vestiva in
Russian. 29 January 1992, Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOY-1.)2-021. 31
January 1992): 29.
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administration.221 Nevertheless, Poland has no choice but to accept natural gas from
Russia.222
Faced with uncertain Russian oil and natural gas supplies the East Central European
nations have begun looking for alternative sources of energy. Primarily, negotiations have
been conducted with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In January 1991, Hungary
signed an agreement to buy four million MT of oil from Saudi Arabia.223 In May, Iran
concluded an agreement with Hungary to provide one million MT of oil. Although the
Iranian negotiations were successful in finding other energy sources, they also illustrated
the predicament in which the East Central European nations find themselves; the
negotiations were difficult because Iran wanted Hungary to pay more than the market
221Throughout January 1992, there seems to have been some confusion as to whelher or nOllhere WU1>.
in fact, a drop in Russian supplies of oil and natural gas. On 24 January, the Polish minislry of foreign
economic relations said Poland was only getting 55 percent of normal natuml gas supplies from Russia and
none of its oil. However, a government press spokesman said the January quota of oil was reaching Poland.
but that natural gas supplies were only 60 percent of the level agreed to by Russia and Poland.
Nevertheless, on 27 January, it was announced that Russian oil deliveries to Poland had resumed after a
break since 13 January. Eighty thousand lonnes were delivered on 27 January, and anolher 70.000 MT were
promised before the end of the month. However, even with these amounts, plus lhe 130.000 MT delivered
prior to 13 January, Russian deliveries would not meet the 300,000 MT 4uola agreed upon. Sec
"'Confusion' Over Reports on Russian Gas Supplies" (text), Warsaw PAP in English. 2234 GMT. 24
January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017, 27 January 19lJ2): 22; ;Uld "'Soviet'
Oil Deliveries Resume; Gas Shortage" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1622 GMT. 27 January IlJlJ2. FBIS
Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-018, 28 January 19(2): 18-19.
222"Russia To Restrict Natural Gas Supplies" (text), Warsaw Radio Warszawa Nelwork in Polish. UOO
GMT, 13 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ2-00H. 13
January 1992): 24.
m"Agreement Reached With Saudi Arabia To Buy Oil" (lext). Budapesl DOlI\eslic Service in
Hungarian, 1700 GMT, 7 January 199 I. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Dailv Re·port. Easlern Europe (FBIS-EEU-
91-005,8 January 1991): 22.
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price for its oi1.224 In June, Iran also agreed to takeover lagging Soviet oil exports to
Czechoslovakia, providing about 12 million MT through Yugoslavia's Adria pipeline.225
Despite these alternate sources, the East Central European nations admit that Russian
oil would be cheaper simply from the standpoint of transponation costs. The Friendship
Pipeline already connects Russia with Eastern Europe, requiring no additional
transponation means. In addition, the civil war in Yugoslavia has interrupted the flow
of oil from the Adria Pipeline. Croatian operators indicate their portion of the pipeline
is intact, but there has been no clear information from the Serbian side.226 Oil still
flows from Russia, but alternate sources for Middle Eastern oil must now be found.
Hungary is looking to receive oil via Western Europe through the Austrian pipeline, but
224"Minister on Oil Pw-chase From Iran" (text), Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian. 1200 GMT,
1 May 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-085, 2 May 1991): 21.
22S"Industry Minister on Iranian Oil Deal" (text). Prague CfK in English. 1601 GMT. 20 June 1991.
FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Ew-ope (FBIS-EEU-91-123. 26 June 1991): 10. Czechoslovakia may also
participate in constructing a pipeline connecting Iranian natural gas fields with Central and Western Europe
through Tw-key, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Austria. From Austria the pipeline would branch out
to Germany, France, and Central Europe. including Czechoslovakia. Annual capacity of the pipeline is
estimated at 28-32 billion cubic meters, of which Czechoslovakia would take 4-6 billion. The pipeline is
no doubt an attempt to find alternate supplies to Russian natural gas.
226"Oil, Gas Trust Analyzes Resources, Import Supply" (text), Budapest Magvar Nem:et in Hungarian.
9 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-220. 14 November
1991): 21. Apparently there is nothing physically wrong with the pipeline. It was shut off on 16 September
1991. purely for political reasons. However. there is still no indication as to when it will be reopened. In
January 1992 a Czechoslovak government delegation was planning to travel to Croatia and Slovenia to
discuss reopening the pipelifle. but in the meantime Czechoslovakia is still looking for alternative oil
sources. See "Adria Pipeline Still Closed Due to Politics" (text). Budapest MTI in English, IX02 GMT. 12
February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-030. 13 February lYY2): Y: and "Oil
Flowing From Russia; Other Routes Outlined" (text). Prague CSTK in English. 213Y GMT. 24 Janu:u)'
1992. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017. 27 January 19Y2): 11.
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this could take years and an undetennined amount of money to complete.227 Hungary
could also receive oil by rail from Rotterdam, and if Russia stops expolting oil, Hungary
could get Iranian oil through Romania and the Friendship Pipeline.22x
Czechoslovakia probably finds itself in a similar situation. However, Czechoslovakia
has taken the initiative to find alternative European sources for oil. At the first NACC
meeting in December 1991, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier discussed with
Secretary of State Baker and NATO Secretary General Womer the need to accelerate the
building of new pipelines in order to diversify Czechoslovakia's oil supplies.22'J In
February 1992, the Czech Republic government approved the construction of an oil
pipeline from Gennany. Pipeline operations are expected to begin in 1994 or 1995230
and should have a capacity of 10 to 15 million tonnes per year.231
227"Alternative Source of Oil Imports Explored" (text); Budapest MTI in English. 1252 GMT. 6
November 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-216. 7 November IYlJl): 13.
228"Commerce Minister on Impact" (text), Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian. 1700 GMT.
17 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ 1-222. I~
November 1991): 16.
229"Dienstbier Discusses NACC Meeting Talks" (text), Prague CSTK in English. 1437 GMT. 21
December 1991. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-248, 24 December IlJlJ I): 8.
230"Czechs Sanction Oil Pipeline From Germany" (text). Prague CSTK in English. 1714 GMT. 4
February 1992. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ2-026. 7 Fehruury IYY2): 6.
231"Czechs Sanction Oil Pipeline From Germany" (excerpt). Prague 1-los{Jodarske NCiViILV in Czech. 5
February 1992. Tmns. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-lJ2-026. 7 February
1992):6. The pipeline is expected to cost nine billion korunas. but if used to capacity it should pay for itself
in fifteen years.
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For Poland there is the additional option of importing oil through its Baltic ports. On
the whole, however, it still appears mutually advantageous for both Russia and East
Central Europe to keep oil flowing between the regions. Of course, Russia should not
base its entire economy on the export of a single natural resource, but at present it seems
that the efficient management of its oil industry will help improve its foreign trade
standing.
E. CONCLUSION
In the post-Warsaw Pact era, Russia is caught between two competing interests in its
economic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. On the one hand, there
is the historical Russian trend of using economics as merely another means of controlling
satellite nations. On the other hand, there is the ever present realization that the key to
Russian internal stability is economic development. At the same time, the Russians
realize there is a profound relationship between domestic stability and international
security.232 Given the decline in the Russian economy and the struggling economies
in East Central Europe, it is certainly in their mutual interest to develop economic
relations.
In addition, the future of trade with East Central Europe may mean the very future of
Russian relations with all of Europe. For centuries East Central Europe has fonned the
bridge over which Russia received its Western influence. These intluences have not
232Major M. Pogovelyy, "Round Table on Foreign Threat, Persian Gulf" (text). Moscow Krasiluvu
Zvezda in Russian, 28 June 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBlS-SOY-lJl-130.
8 July 1991): 64.
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always been wanted, and close proximity to the West has often been regarded as a danger,
but that closeness has nevertheless influenced Russian history. With Russia's western
borders now some 800 miles further east, those influences may disappear. Because the
borders are further away, trade ties remain one of the few means of maintaining contact.
Whether Russia remains a strong military power in the region or whether it is supplanted
by Ukraine remains to be seen, but in the near term its economic capability remains the
best way of exerting its influence in the region.
However, Russia still has a national interest in East Central Europe; an interest in
maintaining the security of its borders while it concentrates on internal reform.
Admittedly, with an independent Ukraine between Russia and the East Central European
nations there seems little point in considering that region as a buffer. However, one must
realize that to many Russians there cannot and will not be a Ukraine separate from
Russia. To them, East Central Europe is the frontier with the West. Without Russian
troops stationed in the region the only means of influencing Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
and Polish policy is through trade; especially natural resources.
East Central Europe, on the other hand, finds itself in a difficult position. For them,
continued trade at this point is still a necessity. This is so not just for the fact that
Russian energy is vital to East Central European industry, but also because there is a great
untapped market for East Central European goods in Russia. Perhaps the importance of
this point was best stated by the director of the office of the Czechoslovak minister of
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foreign trade when he said, "Our interest in trade with the Soviet Union is absolutely not
declining. That would be economic suicide. ,,233
In the forty plus years of Soviet domination, Eastern Europe as a whole suffered from
slow or stagnated economic growth. Although East Central Europe was much better off
than either Bulgaria or Romania, they were nevertheless unable to grow at the same rate
as Western Europe. Nearly fifty years after the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland find themselves among the ranks of developing nations. For that
reason alone they have every right to turn their backs on their former colonial masters.
But like many fonner colonies, the ties to the "mother country" are still strong. These
ties will not be overcome overnight. Nor should they. Nevertheless, both Russia and
East Central Europe stand to gain from continued economic association. In the New
World Order it seems likely that economic power will mean as much if not more than
military power. For Russia and East Central Europe the future of their mutual security
lies in building a strong economy. On the surface, a stronger economy will lead to
greater political stability. There is no doubt that if the population is effectively employed
and able to provide for their basic needs, the government will be able to operate smoothly
and .without being distracted by' domestic upheaval. At the same time, economic
development will encourage better relations throughout Europe through increasing trade
ties.
233"Govemment Official Defends Trade With USSR" (excerpt). Bratislava Pravda in Slovak. 22





RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
AFTER THE WARSAW PACT
La Russie ne boude pas. elle se recuille. -- Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov234
Russia has been unified for a long time in her greatness and her national
unity. Her territorial security is perfectly in order due to her defensive
resources and to the lessons she has given invaders. What is now necessary
is the development of her internal life, her productive resources, her
prosperity, her culture, her commerce, her industry .- all things which
require peace. Her foreign policy should thus be purely preventative and
defensive. -- A.G. Jomini23s
In his 1987 book Perestroika, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev outlined his view of the Soviet Union's place in a new
Europe. In his book he saw the Soviet Union as one "apartment" in a "Common
European Home." His argument emphasized the common cultural and historical roots
shared by the Russians and the other European peoples as a basis for future relations
between them. There is some truth, although slight, to what he said, but it appears that
his main goal was to prevent the Soviet Union from being excluded from Europe.2J6
This is not to say that his theme fell upon deaf ears. Indeed, he admits he first discussed
234"Russia does not sulk, it draws together." Prince Gorchakov was Russian Foreign Minister. IX56-
1882.
235Aleksandr Genrikhovich Jomini (1814-1888), son of the famous geneml Antoine Henri Jomini. was
a senior official in the Russian Foreign Ministry in the 1870s and 1880s.
2360le W:ever. "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian." International Security 66 (July
1990): 482.
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his ideas with French President Fran~ois Mitterrand in 1985, but the dream of a United
States of Europe is as old as the nation-state system itself.237 Given the age old desire
for European unity Gorbachev believed the Soviet Union would be the chief architect of
the Common Home.
Now, five years after the publication of Perestroika, Gorbachev is in semi-retirement
and the country he ruled no longer exists. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet
empire, the map of Europe has been redrawn, adding many more "apartments" to Europe
with the independence of former Soviet republics. Gorbachev's dream of a major Soviet
role in shaping the new European system has vanished and any subse4uent aspirations of
Russian involvement are seriously in doubt. After suffering a major ideological defeat
with the collapse of Soviet communism and a major political defeat with the collapse of
its empire, Russia finds itself rapidly abandoned by its former allies and sister republics
of the Union. As the European republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as the
nations of East Central Europe, rush to join with the states of Western Europe. Russia is
increasingly faced with the prospect of European isolation. Russia's main goal in its
European foreign policy in the 1990s is to avoid this isolation.
Is European isolation bad for Russia? Most certainly, for Russia is faced not only
with political, but economic isolation as well. The leadership of Russia. as well as that
237As early as 1800, the Abbe de Pradt (Dominique de Fourt de Pradt) called Europe a "single social
body which one might rightly caJl the European Republic." which resembled on a large scale what Genn:Uly.
at the time, represented on a smaller scale. Gulick. II.
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of East Central Europe, recognizes that the greatest threat to their security, and to
European security in general, is civil unrest In the fonner Soviet Union. The major
source of that unrest is the economic displacement caused by the collapse of the Soviet
economy. For Russia, economic hardship and subsequent recovery are complicated by
the fact that it has taken on the bulk of the foreign financial obligations of the old Soviet
Union which threatens to drain scarce resources desperately needed at home. In an
interdependent world, economic isolation from Europe can only encourage and hasten the
very internal upheaval many leaders believe they must prevent.
The key to Russia's position as a member of the European system rests on its
relationship with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. These three states are key to
Russian interests in Europe not only because of their geographic position in the center of
Europe, but, perhaps most importantly, because of their economic potential. While
Russian ties to the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions, as
well as the other major industrialized nations, particularly Germany and the U.S., are
important to its economic and political development, it cannot rely solely on loans and
aid from these countries and institutions to salvage Russia's internal system. Russia must
also find the means to stimulate its own economic growth and political restructuring.
Russia can learn policies and programs that stand a chance of success from the
experiences of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This is particularly true in the
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Of all the former WTO
satellites of the Soviet Union, the three East Central European states have shown the
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greatest economic recovery. By no means are Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland
without economic difficulties, and much remains to be done before all of their problems
are solved, but the EC decision to allow associate membership for these countries
illustrates the strides the East Central European nations have made on the road to
economic recovery.
However, the very symbols of East Central European success may mean isolation for
Russia. The region's mad dash to "rejoin the West" is rapidly closing off any opportunity
Russia may have to capitalize on improved economic relations with the West. The
possibility of isolation is particularly true in the economic realm, but East Central
European overtures to NATO may have similar implications. Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
and Polish insistence in joining NATO may imply hostility toward Russia, particularly
since there are some in Russia who still see NATO as inherently anti-Russian. Despite
East Central European statements to the contrary, as the region moves closer to NATO
the more likely East Central Europe will appear to be a buffer zone between Russia and
the West. The existence of a cordon sanitaire not only implies a severing, or at least a
limiting, of relations between the regions, but also that Russia is an enemy. The NATO
nations may only be concerned with their security in the event of civil unrest in the
former Soviet Union, but the message received in Moscow may be quite different. To
Russia such a situation could only be regarded as a move to block Russian patticipation
in the European system.
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While the East Central European nations may be resisting the establishment of a buffer
zone in the region, they are equally adamant concerning the economic prospects of trade
with the West. Nowhere is this more evident than in Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and
Polish relations with the EC. While trade ties with the EC are a boon for East Central
Europe, those ties threaten to undennine Russian economic recovery. This is particularly
true since the state of the Russian economy suggests it will not be offered even associate
membership in the EC any time soon. Russia suffers from the fact that decreased EC
tariffs on East Central European goods favor trade with the EC over trade with Russia.
In addition, as East Central Europe becomes incorporated into the EC, EC tariffs will
apply to Russian goods. Therefore, increased ties with the EC favor trade with the West
at the expense of trade with Russia. At the same time, East Central European efforts to
arrange alternate sources of energy indicate their dependency on Russian energy will not
last forever.
While the prospects are good that Russia is on the road to European isolation, the
entire process will take time. In fact, Russian isolation will not be complete until the East
Central European nations become full members of the EC. Until that time, Russia still
has an opportunity to take full advantage of Western technology and intluence to enhance
Russian internal refonn.
Russia cannot avoid isolation through its security ties with East Central Europe alone.
Indeed, Russia's security must incorporate treaties with the newly independent Soviet
republics of Belarus' and Ukraine. In fact, it is equally important for Russia to ensure
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that domestic reforms in those nations are as successful as its own. However, at the
moment, Russia's current arrangements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland satisfy
its immediate security concern in Europe; i.e., stabilizing the frontier. On the other hand,
these same arrangements do nothing to improve Russia's internal woes and, in reality,
only guarantee that its domestic state will remain free of unwanted external interference.
By themselves, the bilateral security treaties, while forming a foundation for friendly
relations and future cooperation, do not provide Russia the tools it needs to conduct
internal reform; namely trade an~ economic growth.
Therefore, Russia's focal point for East Central European relations must be in the
realm of economic development and mutual trade. Not only can Russia benefit
monetarily from trade with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but it can certainly
benefit from the lessons gained from East Central European economic recovery. 238
Of course, Russia does have options in its foreign economic relations with East Central
Europe. On the one hand, Russia can use its remaining economic contacts with the
region, especially energy, as a means of coercion. At this point, given East Central
Europe's slow pace in discovering alternative sources to Russian energy, Russia does have
an important foreign policy weapon at its disposal. Indeed, in an era in which fonner
2381n this regard, in a December 1991, interview, Hungarian Prime Minister Antal! said. "It would be
very stupid for us to underestimate the vast potential of the...Russian [marketl. In timc your cwnomic
situation will return to normal, 1am sure, and, I repeat, we arc prepared to help this along through our own
experience... F. Lukyanov, "Hungary's Antall on Union Ties" (text), Moscow l:vl!.I'li\'il in Russian. 7
December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report. Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-YI-237. 10 Deccmber
1991),9.
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Soviet, now Russian, troops are withdrawing from the region, energy supplies remain
Russia's only remaining means of affecting policy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland. However, as the East Central European nations find additional sources of energy,
Russia may be able to cause some inconvenience in the region through energy policy, but
its leverage will be drastically decreased.
Another foreign trade issue between Russia and East Central Europe which Russia
could use to its advantage is the question of Russian and Soviet foreign debt to
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Defaulting or postponing payment of the Russian
debt would cause economic disaster in the region. Such an economic weapon might be
quite enticing to a desperate Russia. However, what can Russia gain from such an
intentional act which would far outweigh its costs? Quite simply -- nothing. With
billions of dollars in foreign loans pending and the prospect of billions (perhaps even
hundreds of billions) more in the future, Russia could not afford the impression that it is
a bad credit risk. In short, foreign credit and loans are far too important to Russian
economic reform and recovery at this point to risk losing them for any reason.
Russia's other option in foreign economic relations with East Central Europe is to
encourage continued, and certainly increased, trade with the region. Only through trade
will Russia's economy improve and its internal reforms succeed. The millions of dollars
in foreign loans will aid in establishing a stable foundation for economic growth, but
Russia's economic recovery cannot rest solely on the good will of the governments of the
major industrialized nations. Indeed, as the major economic powers come to grips with
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their own internal problems, less money will be available for improving Russia's
economy. The German government, for example, increasingly confronts the fact that
unification will consume much more effort and treasure than many believed in the rush
of 1990. Indeed, in a 5 May 1992 speech at the United Nations, German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl stated that his country had "reached the limit" of its capacity to help the
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe make the transition to
democracy and a market economy. The rising costs of unification have placed increasing
strain on the German budget. In addition, Germany has already promised $47 billion to
the former Soviet Union and another $65 billion to Eastern Europe (most of this amount
is going to the areas of the former German Democratic Republic) -- more than any other
nation. In his speech, Kohl called upon the other major industrialized nations, particularly
Japan, to contribute more to Eastern European recovery, indicating Germany was nearing
the end of its rope.239 At the same time, recent events in the U.S. have called attention
to underlying domestic concerns which may refuse to be ignored any longer. In addition,
rising domestic sentiment that America has done enough to aid Europe threaten to hamper
funding of additional Russian aid.
Faced with the prospect that foreign economic assistance may be limited in the future,
as well as the fact that only through increased markets for exported goods can its
economy improve, Russia must seek to improve trade ties with all nations. For the time
239Pau1 Lewis, "Kohl Presses Japan to Do More to Assist East Europe:Ul Lands." The New York Times.
6 May 1992, Ai.
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being, Russia still has existing trade ties with East Central Europe, but these are rapidly
dwindling. Increasingly Gennany is taking Russia's place as the major trade partner with
the East Central European nations. However, there are still opportunities for trade. There
are Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish goods which do not sell in the West, but do sell
in Russia. There is also the prospect of agricultural trade.
One means of encouraging the development of trade between East Central Europe and
Russia is through Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier's "Triangular Plan." The
plan, first presented at Harvard University in May 1990, calls for Western subsidies for
Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish exports to the former Soviet republics. 240
Dienstbier presented the plan again at the 22 January 1992 opening of the international
aid conference for the former Soviet Union. Dienstbier, as well as Hungarian and Polish
officials, argued that the plan helps both East Central Europe and the republics of the
former Soviet Union. As Polish President Walesa stated later in the day, "What good is
it if the West helps only Poland" and allows the former Soviet Union to destabilize the
whole region by descending into chaos?241 The plan was accepted by the conference on
24 January and one-quarter of EC credit for the CIS, 500 million ECU (about $600
million), is earmarked for sales from the East Central European nations. 242
240'''Triangular Plan' Accepted" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2037 GMT, 24 January IYY2. FBIS
Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017. 27 January 1992), 10.
241Barbara Koulik and Wladyslaw Minkiewicz. "EE Plan for Aid to Ex-USSR." RFE(RL Dailv Rcpol1.
23 January 1992.
242'''Triangular Plan' Accepted." 10.
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However, this plan is only a start. While Russia realizes there are opportunities for
trade with East Central Europe, Russia cannot allow those opportunities to be dictated by
outside forces. Indeed, if Russia surrenders the initiative on trade issues it runs the risk
of limiting its economic growth to only those goods currently desired by its trade partners.
Limiting Russia's exports to only a few goods, particularly energy and other raw
materials, may be beneficial in generating hard currency reserves to repay foreign debt
in the near term, but this policy does nothing to improve the vast number of other
industries slowly being driven into idleness. Russia must find additional products with
which to trade in order to rebuild its domestic economy. If its industry is allowed to
stagnate, the internal dissent which many fear will become a reality threatening to spill
over its borders into other parts of Europe. Severe internal instability can only ensure the
isolation of Russia to prevent the spread of unrest. At the moment trade with East
Central Europe offers the best means of generating the economic growth necessary to
improve overall social conditions within Russia.
The importance of Russian economic policy 10 East Central Europe to the U.S. is
clear. As long as the U.S. sees overall European security as a part of its national interest,
it is imperative that Russia not be allowed to descend into social and economic turmoil.
In this regard it is in the U.S. interest to ensure that the Russian national interest in East
Central Europe be acknowledged and protected. Russian internal reform must be allowed
to succeed otherwise Yeltsin will not last. A known Boris Yeltsin, good or bad, is better
than an unknown who might very likely be a Russian neo-imperialist. Obviollsly, one
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might argue that this mentality motivated continued support for Gorbachev even after it
was apparent that he was no longer of any political consequence. However, when it
became evident after August or September 1991, that Gorbachev was more a hinderance
than a help to Soviet reform, there was a viable, acceptable alternative in Boris Yeltsin.
At this point in time, some six months after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are
no acceptable alternatives to Yeltsin, although there are dissenting voices in Russia.
Among the most outspoken of Yeltsin's critics are Aleksandr Rutskoi and Vladimir
Zhirinovsky. Neither of these would-be contenders for the Russian presidency can be
tolerated, both representing a right wing segment calling for the re-establishment of
Russia's pre-December 1991 borders (i.e., the borders of the old Soviet Union) or, as in
Zhirinovsky's case, the pre-1917 borders, which would include Finland and parts of
Poland.243
However, acknowledging the Russian national interest in East Central Europe does not
imply sacrificing the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The return
of Russian hegemony in the region is just as likely to cause Russian isolation from
Europe as the decline of Russian internal stability. Instead, what is required is an
understanding that Russian internal reform is linked to its ties with the West through its
natural bridge in Central Europe. In this regard it is equally important for the U.S. to
disavow its Cold War mentality. At this point, Russia does not have the political or
243Although Zhirinovsky has renounced this position. there are likely still others who make the same
claim.
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economic wherewithal to occupy its former East European dominions. Chief among its
goals domestically is the establishment of stable political, social, and economic
institutions. Its chief foreign policy aims are to ensure those institutions are successfully
built. At the moment there can be no room for foreign adventurism. Whether or not
Russia returns to its old ways once its internal house is in order is a matter of speculation,
but even in that event the initial targets would likely be the Slavic republics of Belarus'
and Ukraine.
Therefore it is 10 the interest of the U.S. to ensure Russia's reform process is
successful. In achieving that interest it is important that the U.S. prevent the isolation of
Russia from Europe. There are several ways of approaching this goal. In general, the
U.S. should encourage Russian participation in established European multinational
organizations. Certainly Russia will figure strongly in the ongoing Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) process by virtue of its large stockpiles of weaponry, but that is not
enough. Indeed, there are already those in RU$sia who criticize NATO's motives. They
see NATO asking Russia to cut its armaments while NATO countries maintain current
levels which go beyond what is necessary for their defense.244 Russia must not feel that
it is being treated like a defeated power, as Germany was at the end of World War 1.
During the interwar period German political isolation and pressing economic woes led to
the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis -- this cannot be allowed to happen in Russia.
However, Russia must be allowed to participate in other organizations where its input is
244Baryshev. 5.
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sought to solve greater European problems. Obviously, CSCE fits this purpose, although
that organization's effectiveness is questionable. However, CSCE does offer an
opportunity for Russia to participate in greater European issues. Another avenue of
Russian participation is the NACC.
Economically, the U.S. should encourage the continuation and further development of
trade ties between Russia and East Central Europe. The goal here is to begin to improve
the Russian economy so that it, too, may be in a position to reasonably ask for EC
membership. If trade is not adequately developed before East Central Europe becomes
heavily integrated into the EC, then Russian isolation, and its negative effects, is a given.
In sum, the U.S. and the West are faced with two options in its treatment of post-
Soviet Russia. On the one hand, Russia can be treated with the same disdain and
harshness as the Allies treated Germany at the end of World War I. In this case, Russia,
like Germany, is denied entry into the European system and is allowed to flounder in
internal political and economic chaos as a new, Russian, Weimar Republic. The ultimate
consequences of the interwar Allied policies were paid for with the lives of millions of
Allied soldiers between 1941 and 1945.
On the other hand, Russia can be welcomed into the European community of nations,
although slowly, and its internal structures rebuilt with Western aid. In other words, the
West can model its treatment of Russia after that of Germany in the post-World War II
period. Obviously, the treatment of Germany was largely dictated by the fact that it was
occupied by Allied armies, but the point is that Germany was allowed into the family of
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nations. Of the two options facing the West, this option certainly appears the most
palatable.
For Russia there is only one real option in its foreign policy. It must secure the
success of radical restructuring of its social, political, and economic system. This
transformation will not come easy, but the shocks that are likely to occur can be eased
through greater cooperation with the West. The key to its continued access to the West
is through Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the frontier between East and West.
Because of the importance of Western influence in Russia's reform process, the success
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